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利用2010年中国17个农业大省的抽样调查数据,本文考察了农民对征地满意度的决定。研究发现,总体而言,当征地补偿款全部发放给农民、政府或村干部与农民事先协商征地补偿水平、征地补偿水平较高时,农民对征地的满意度将显著更高。通过控制事先协商与征地补偿水平的交互项,我们进一步发现,只有事先与农民就征地补偿水平进行了协商,那些征地补偿水平较高的村农民对征地的满意度才显著更高。这说明,在实践中,我们需要在维护农民对征地过程参与权的前提下,提高征地的补偿水平。此外,我们也发现,当征地用于公益建设时,农民对征地的满意度要比非公益建设征地时显著更高。

本文利用互联网大数据探究土地征收中的农民诉求。本研究搜集了人民网"地方领导留言板"超过一百万条网友留言记录,借鉴结果和程序正义的思路将土地征收中的农民诉求划分为货币性补偿、社会保障与安置、市民身份的转变、土地征收的合法性、过程的公开性和透明性五大主题,通过中文分词、词频统计等方法对征地相关内容进行统计分析。结果发现:(1)农民更关注结果正义,诉求集中于货币性补偿及社会保障与安置;(2)五个诉求主题的受关注度呈现显著的时间演变特征与空间差异。本文得出的政策启示是,征地制度改革应当持续在结果正义上发力,但也应当注意程序正义以回应农民逐渐觉醒的权利意识。同时,征地政策的制定应力求因时、因地制宜。

在全面深化智慧法院建设的背景下,人民法院信息化建设成果为透视社会矛盾和加强诉源治理提供了新的利器。基于司法大数据,对全国范围内2016至2020年间涉农地诉讼案件进行分析和研判,总结我国涉农地各类诉讼案件诉源出现的新特点,可以发现引发涉农地诉讼的原因错综复杂,这些原因包括农村土地承包制度、宅基地制度和农村集体经营性建设用地制度等农村土地制度的变迁,农业农村现代化与农业政策转型、新型城镇化、乡村振兴战略及户籍制度变化等国家乡村发展战略的实施,农村土地价值提升、市场经营风险增加等市场经济环境因素,司法公开、立案登记制、诉讼费制度改革等司法体制改革措施的推行。对涉农地诉讼诉源治理的精准施策需要准确认识上述原因,司法大数据研究能为如何建构适用于不同地区、不同时间的动态变化的社会治理框架提供参考。

本文通过掌握全国7省190个村1896户农民的基础数据,对农村土地纠纷的发生概率、基本特征和影响因素进行量化评估,力求为相关部门及时防控、化解土地纠纷提供科学决策依据。结果发现:一是2005年以来样本地区土地纠纷发生率低于10%,可推测全国范围内纠纷发生率在10%以内是大概率事件;二是纠纷不具有群体性,但在少数农户中具有一定集中性和反复性,不同地区纠纷的集中程度存在差异;三是在各类纠纷中,承包经营纠纷是最主要的纠纷类型,占到一半以上;四是目前多数纠纷已处理,调解为主要途径;五是土地确权中的纠纷问题并不严重,但某些环节引发的问题要重点关注;六是地权不稳定、政策变动等因素是土地纠纷发生的重要诱因。

本文采用2011—2018年中国健康与养老追踪调查数据，实证分析了征地对人们健康状况的短期和长期影响。研究结果表明，征地短期内能改善人们健康状况，即显著降低了抑郁水平、患高血压概率以及慢性病数量；但长期来看，征地对人们健康的影响显著为负，它增加了人们的精神压力、提高了人们患慢性病的概率，并使得人们的睡眠时间减少。进一步的机制分析显示，短期的正影响主要是征地的货币补偿起作用；长期的负影响是由征地限制了人们的就业机会，特别是老年人很难向非农产业转移所导致。

研究目的:探究土地征收对农户收入的影响,并分析其影响机制和空间差异性,为进一步完善征地制度改革提供思路。研究方法:基于CHFS2013年和2015年的追踪调查数据,运用倍差法识别了征地对农户收入的因果效应,并进一步关注了征地效应的作用渠道和空间分异性。研究结果:征地在导致农户农业收入下降的同时,也增加了农户的工资性收入和政府转移性收入。总体而言,征地显著增加了农户的家庭收入。进一步研究发现,征地的增收效应在东部省份强于中、西部省份。研究结论:在征地制度改革的过程中,一方面需要为失地后丧失收入来源的农户提供最低生活保障,另一方面应当注重对失地农民人力资本的培训,保障农民在离开土地后依然能够妥善就...

本文利用江苏省镇江市7个区(市)40个村共1703户被征地农户的问卷调查数据,以样本地区被征地农户的受偿满意程度间接衡量中央政府征地补偿政策效应,通过建立多元有序Logistic回归模型来分析被征地农户受偿满意程度的影响因素。实证分析结果显示:①地方政府执行中央政府颁布的征地补偿政策,在时间和内容上均出现滞后或偏离,地方政府征地补偿政策执行滞后偏离程度越大,被征地农户受偿满意程度越低,中央政府征地补偿政策效应就越低。②被征地农户家庭特征、被征地地区的经济发展水平和被征地块的特征因素,都会在一定程度上影响被征地农户的受偿满意程度。对此,中央政府应该加大对地方政府执行征地补偿政策的监督,构建包括征地补偿方案编制、实施、监管全过程的被征地农户补偿的长效机制。

本研究基于2009年全国12个城市征地大样本抽样调查数据,运用Logit模型就征地谈判对征地补偿的影响进行计量分析。研究表明,只要存在谈判,被征地农户实际获得的征地补偿就高于当地政府制定的征地补偿标准;从边际上看,存在谈判将使征地补偿水平高出当地政府制订的补偿标准的概率提高37.2%。因此,在征地制度改革过程中,就征地程序的某些环节做一定的改进,比如增加协商谈判的环节,不仅是可行的,对被征地农民也是有利的。

本文利用农业部农村固定观测点16省份的调查数据,研究了我国城市化征地对农民健康风险的影响。基于Grossman健康需求理论,本文实证分析的结果发现,我国城市化征地降低了农村居民的健康水平,被征地农民的健康状况显著低于有地农民的健康状况。造成这种现象的主要原因,在于我国政府征用农业用地时补偿标准较低,农民实际得到的补偿款较少,无力进行必要的健康投资,降低了被征地农民的健康水平。因此,应该完善现行征地补偿政策,提高被征地农民的健康水平,增强被征地农民的收入获取能力,促进我国城市化的发展。

研究目的：探究长江经济带土地纠纷演变特征及影响因素，为制定多元防范化解土地纠纷政策提供参考；研究方法：基于中国裁判文书网公开审判文书构建长江经济带11省市2011—2020年土地纠纷审判案件数据集，利用经典数理统计方法和固定效应模型进行研究。研究结果：(1)2011—2020年，长江经济带土地纠纷呈现出纠纷数量先增后减、纠纷时间相对集中、纠纷分布西多东少、纠纷时段缩短明显、小额案件比例缩小、协调结案比例大增的演变特征。(2)城市化进程中土地增值带来的巨大收益争夺是土地纠纷案件增多的重要驱动因素；农村集体产权制度改革会触及利益纠纷，对土地纠纷案件数量增加具有显著正向影响；解纷投入力度对土地纠纷案件数量控制效应显著；经济增长对土地纠纷案件数量的增加影响显著，随着经济增长土地纠纷案件数量会出现先增加后减少的倒U型变化规律；二三产业增加、当年征收集体土地面积、政府法制宣传投入力度均对土地纠纷案件增加具有正向影响。研究结论：长江经济带土地纠纷正朝好的方向发展，但纠纷数量和标的依旧较大，其背后原因十分复杂，经济利益的驱动是土地纠纷的根本原因。应持续推动经济发展方式转变、农村集体产权制度改革，加大土地法制建设和解纷投入力度，建立土地纠纷多元预防调处综合机制。

This is the Introduction to a special issue containing twelve articles studying the dispossession of rural land in China and India. Each article offers new insights about the extent and patterns of dispossession, the complex dynamics driving it, the consequences for farmers, and the factors shaping resistance or compliance. Although each article treats developments within one country, the collection helps uncover features common to rural land dispossession in China and India, and illuminates differences that shape the processes of dispossession in each country. During the developmentalist period, the Indian and Chinese governments both expropriated large tracts of rural land for state development projects; the subsequent period of economic liberalization has seen not only greatly accelerated dispossession, but also greatly expanded purposes deemed appropriate for dispossession. The Journal of Peasant Studies 47(6): 1109-1142.

The prevailing argument that quasi-democratic institutions in authoritarian regimes improve governance outcomes hinges on the presumption that institutions empower non-state actors and constrain the discretionary power of ruling elites, a concept we call institutional bindingness. However, institutions are not always binding, and the degree of institutional bindingness varies across contexts. The article examines the bindingness of village elections in China. Through the lens of land expropriation in peri-urban villages and using survey data, they find that institutional bindingness, operationalized in terms of the power structure within village leadership, strongly shapes the processes and outcomes of land expropriations and therefore the quality of village governance.

This paper examines how political trust across local government levels and risk preferences impact individual support to land-taking compensation policies in China. Land expropriation becomes a touchstone for protests and conflict during China’s urbanization, driving local governments to diversify land-taking compensation from the traditional one-time lump-sum cash payment to multiple payments, notably, in the form of monthly pension payments and yearly dividends. We found that political trust in the countylevel government positively correlates with individual support to pension payments; political distrust in the village collective induces villagers to favor the one-time payment to yearly dividends. Both riskaverse and risk-seeking individuals prefer the one-time cash payment to yearly dividends. The findings are developed using two choice experiments embedded in an original survey: we elicit individual policy support by asking villagers to state their preferences over hypothetical alternative compensation policies; we elicit risk preferences using a lottery-choice experiment with varying probability of winning real monetary rewards. The findings highlight the multi-level local government structure under decentralization and offer insight into to what extent the government efforts in innovative compensation policies are effective at quelling rural anger.

China's rapid urbanization has been fueled by dispossession and subsequent commodification of villagers' land. We use interviews and an original survey of land-losing villagers to examine factors that influence their opposition to land expropriation. We find that villagers are less opposed to land expropriation when local authorities reduce the gap between land-taking compensation paid to them and the land's market value, distribute compensation expeditiously, publicize processes and procedures, and encourage public participation in the process of land expropriation. Our study, while acknowledging massive dispossession and displeasure with it, shows that autocratic governments can sugarcoat the bitter pill of land expropriation.

Using a large sample of unlisted industrial firms in China, we find that a decrease in local governments’ land transfer revenues leads to lower tax avoidance by firms within their jurisdiction. Our cross-sectional variation tests suggest that the tax-avoidance-reduction effect is stronger in cities with higher land finance dependence and government intervention, as well as where the political leaders have stronger promotion incentives. However, the effect is moderated for politically connected firms. Further analysis reveals that intensified tax enforcement is the mechanism through which land transfer revenue losses result in decreased tax avoidance. Our study offers novel evidence on a previously underexplored determinant of corporate tax avoidance through the lens of land finance. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance. Funding: The authors acknowledge financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72002105, 71972089 and 72132002]. T. Chen is grateful for the financial support from the Singapore Ministry of Education Academic Research Fund [Grant 2015-T2-1-118, RG166/18] and the Natural Science Foundation of Guangdong Province, China [Grants 2018A03031043 and 2019A1515011635]. C. (C.) Zeng acknowledges the start-up research fund from the Hong Kong Polytechnic University [Grant A0035237]. Supplemental Material: Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4191 .

Using a unique nationwide survey of rural China, we examine the effects of property rights insecurity (PRI) created by undercompensated land requisitions (ULRs). To preclude the confounding impact of land losses on the behavior of displaced households, we adopt a novel approach comparing unaffected households in counties with massive ULRs and their counterparts in land-requisitioned counties without widespread ULRs, adjusted by their respective control group households in adjacent non-land-requisitioned counties. The group from counties with widespread ULRs exhibits significantly lower trust in local governments, employs risk-proof strategies to cope with perceived PRI, and experiences a decline in farming efficiency and household welfare.

Agriculture made major contributions to China's growth and poverty reduction, but the literature has rarely focused on the institutional factors that might underpin such structural transformation and productivity. Drawing on an 8-year panel of 1,200 households in six provinces, we find that land tenure insecurity, measured by past land reallocations, discourages households from quitting agriculture, and the recognition of land rights through formal certificates encourages the temporary migration of rural labor. A sustained increase in nonagricultural opportunities will reinforce the importance of secure land tenure, a precondition for successful structural transformation and continued economic attractiveness of rural areas.

This article provides evidence from one of the poorest countries in the world that the institutions of property rights matter for efficiency, investment, and growth. With all land state-owned, the threat of land redistribution never appears far off the agenda. Land rental and leasing have been made legal, but transfer rights remain restricted and the perception of continuing tenure insecurity remains quite strong. Using a unique panel data set, this study investigates whether transfer rights and implied tenure insecurity affect household investment decisions, focusing on trees and shrubs. The panel data estimates suggest that limited perceived transfer rights negatively affects the long-term investment in Ethiopian agriculture, contributing to the low returns from land and perpetuating low growth and poverty.

How ought farmers displaced by acquisition of agricultural land for the purpose of industrialization be compensated? Prior to acquisition, the farmers are leasing in land from a private owner or local government with a legally mandated sharecropping contract. Compensation rules affect the decision of the landlord to sell the land ex post to an industrial developer, and ex ante incentives of tenants and landlord to make specific investments in agricultural productivity. The main result is that under a broad class of circumstances, independent of equity considerations, efficiency considerations alone require farmers be over-compensated for their loss.

Economic transitions in countries that move from state planning and redistribution to market exchange create business opportunities but also uncertainty, because many interdependent factors—modes of exchange, types of products, and forms of organizations—are in flux. Uncertainty is even greater when the country’s political institutions remain authoritarian because the rule of law is weak and state bureaucrats retain power over the economy. This study of listed firms in China, which has recently seen economic transition but persistent authoritarianism, shows that in such contexts, firms can reduce uncertainty by developing relationships with state bureaucrats, which help firms learn how state bureaucracies operate and engender trust between firms and bureaucrats. Together, knowledge and trust stabilize operations and help persuade bureaucrats to lighten regulatory burdens, grant firms access to state-controlled resources, and improve government oversight. Our results show that as economic transitions proceed and uncertainty increases, business–state ties increasingly improve firm performance. We also investigate two likely contingencies, industry and firm size, and two important causal mechanisms, access to bank loans and protection from related-party loans, and show that the value of business–state relations varies over time, depending on the trajectory of both economic and political institutions.

The article argues that it might be more insightful to move beyond concepts of formal and informal, private and common, or secure and insecure institutions, by positing the credibility thesis, drawing attention to institutional function over time and space rather than to a desired form postulated by theory or political conviction. The article takes China as a case study, with particular reference to its rural land-lease system, which is perceived to be highly insecure due to forced evictions and government intervention. The study finds significant social support for the rural land-lease system and a low level of conflict; these findings indicate that the form of the Chinese rural lease system (insecure tenure) is the outcome of its present function (provision of social welfare). When conflict does occur, expropriation is a prime cause for it. Land Use Policy 40.

Using a nationally representative dataset from China, we exploit an event study approach to trace out the consequences of land expropriation on household economic behaviors and health outcomes. The expropriated rural households receive an average compensation per capita of over 6 thousand yuan (60 percent of pre-event income) immediately after expropriation and thus have a higher income level. Among the people in these households, the likelihood of working in the agricultural sector decreases while that of working in the non-agricultural sector increases. Meanwhile, medical consumption per capita increases substantially by 0.4 thousand yuan and the saving rate rises by 14 percentage points. People in these households experience a significant improvement in subjective health status, in terms of self-reported health and depression, while their health-related behaviors do not change significantly. Overall, land expropriation influences the economic and health conditions of the affected rural households by providing additional liquidity.

The paper uses household data from northeast China to examine the link between investment and land tenure insecurity induced by China's system of village-level land reallocation. The authors quantify expropriation risk using a hazard analysis of individual plot tenures and incorporate the predicted hazards of expropriation into an empirical analysis of plot-level investment, focusing on organic fertilizer use, which has long-lasting benefits for soil quality. Although they find that higher expropriation risk significantly reduces application of organic fertilizer, a welfare analysis shows that guaranteeing land tenure in this part of China would yield only minimal efficiency gains.

Land expropriation, where peasants’ property rights are encroached by the state, has been recognized as a primary source of social dissension in rural China. Since the end of the last century, the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL) has provided people with a legal weapon to defend themselves against violations by state power. Drawing on the theory of relative deprivation, this paper proposes that peasants are more likely to sue the state when they feel deprived. To examine this hypothesis, we first present a case study to depict the causal process and then use quantitative research to improve the external validity of our findings. We created a novel and unique database of prefecture-level administrative litigations and relative deprivation for Poisson regression analysis. The quantitative results prove that the more peasants feel relatively deprived, the more likely they are to sue the state. Furthermore, the positive effect of relative deprivation on administrative litigations has become more significant over time, implying peasants’ growing awareness of legal resistance. This paper concludes that a critical step towards eliminating social inequity and maintaining social stability in rural China is to reduce the relative deprivation of peasants by, for example, allowing them to share in land value appreciation in the process of urbanization., 摘要由于在征地的过程中农民丧失了对土地的使用权，因此土地征收成为了中国农村社会纠纷的一个重要来源。自上世纪末以来，《行政诉讼法》为民众提供了应对国家权力侵犯的法律武器。借鉴相对剥夺理论，本文提出假说：当农民感到被剥夺时，他们更有可能起诉政府。为了检验这一假说，我们首先通过案例分析描述因果过程，然后通过定量研究提高其外部效度。基于由行政诉讼案件和相对剥夺感指标构建而成的数据库，我们利用泊松回归模型对假说进行检验。回归结果表明，农民相对剥夺感程度越高，该城市关于征地的行政诉讼案件越多。此外，随着时间的推移，相对剥夺对行政诉讼的正向影响越来越显著，这意味着农民的法律意识日益增强。本文的结论是，降低农民的相对剥夺感是减小社会不平等、维护中国农村社会稳定的关键步骤。允许农民在城市化过程中分享土地增值收益将是其中的关键举措。

Land requisition has been an important way for local Chinese governments to generate revenue and promote urbanization, but little is known how the land-losing farmers cope. This study investigates the impact of land requisition on farmers' off-farm labor participation. We provide evidence that rural-urban migration is one way that land-losing farmers now adapt to land requisition. Using data from the China Household Finance Survey, we first show that village characteristics, not household characteristics, are the key determining factors for how likely a household is to lose land. With a traditional difference-in-differences (DD) model and a DD model with individual fixed effects, we show that land loss due to government requisition has a significant migration effect in the total sample: it increases individual migration rates by 4.5-6.8 percentage points. Land requisition has no impact on local off-farm engagement. These findings are robust to using different samples, to correction for sample attrition, and to a falsification test. We also find that the migration effect is experienced in particular by younger and older farmers, by women, and by the better educated.

Political decentralization is often argued to strengthen political accountability by bringing government closer to the people. Social and civic institutions at the local level, such as lineage associations, temples, churches, or social clubs, can make it easier for citizens to monitor officials and hold them accountable. This article argues that strong social institutions also empower local elites who may use their informal influence to control their group and capture rents. Drawing on evidence from case studies of Chinese villages, the article shows that lineage group leaders who become village officials use their combination of social and political authority to confiscate villagers’ land. Evidence from a survey experiment suggests that endorsement of a land confiscation plan by lineage elites elicits greater compliance with property seizures. A national survey indicates that when a lineage leader becomes a village cadre, it is associated with a 14 to 20 percent increase in the likelihood of a land expropriation. The findings demonstrate how informal institutions and local civil society can be tools of top-down political control.

Developers attempting land assembly often face a potential holdout problem that raises the cost of development. To minimize this extra cost, developers will prefer land whose ownership is less dispersed. This creates a bias toward development at the urban fringe where average lot sizes are larger, resulting in urban sprawl. This paper examines the link between the holdout problem and urban sprawl and discusses possible remedies, including the use of eminent domain for urban redevelopment. Journal of Housing Economics 16(3-4): 309-319.

The urban resale housing market has seen an increasing influence from the judicial auction housing segment. This study delves into judicial auction housing discounts and the underpinning mechanisms from the standpoint of buyer risk preference and market interplay. Transaction data from 11 prominent cities in China, spanning July 2017 to October 2020, were analyzed. Principal empirical outcomes suggest an average economic depreciation for China’s judicial auction housing market of approximately 14%, corroborated by our neighbor-matched sample. Key findings suggest a substitution effect between the judicial auction and regular resale segments and highlight the significance of purchasing risk as a determinant for this channel. Moreover, an increase in uncertainty about the overall market environment could intensify demand flowing out of the judicial auction market as well as its economic depreciation. The results offer insightful implications for policy designers, emphasizing the enhancement of judicial auction housing quality and the need for improving transparency of information in the resale housing market.

The role of formal tenure institutions in reducing land tenure insecurity has been long debated in the development economics literature. This study examines and compares the key determinants of perceptions of security of tenure over contract land and wasteland, two types of land that are characterized by tenure being formally and informally ascribed. The material is drawn from the Chinese region of Xinjiang, an ethnically heterogeneous region which has more complex tenure systems than elsewhere in China. Empirical estimations based on a survey of 352 households, complemented by interviews with key informants, demonstrate that formal institutions (measured by official land documents) do not significantly contribute to households' perceptions of tenure security on either type of land, and that both interpersonal trust and political trust significantly enhance perceived tenure security on either land type in our research area. The empirical evidence further shows that perceptions of tenure security on both types of land are more sensitive to trust towards village cadres than trust in villagers.

This paper examines how debates in the media are providing the discursive conditions for, and thereby giving impetus to, diverse strategies of `so-called primitive accumulation' in China. Taking as its empirical referent Chinese news and journal articles on land enclosure, the paper analyzes three frames in which policy entrepreneurs craft varying class positions for land-losing villagers. Grounded in different ontological premises, problem diagnoses and recommendations centering on the adoption of either a statist, neo-collective or liberal rural land regime, and backed up by evaluations of local policy experiments, the frames illustrate the diversity of ideational, political and institutional configurations that could facilitate the separation of peasant producers from the land, place land-losing villagers in different relationships with the state and capital, and sustain accumulation. In foregrounding these debates over land-losing villagers' future class positioning, the paper aims to offer a corrective to the historical determinism implicit in contemporary analyses that characterize enclosure in China as simply one national manifestation of homogenous, global neo-liberal projects of `accumulation by dispossession' or `gangster capitalism'.

I study the political consequences of state expropriation of agricultural land in rural China by using national individual-level panel data for the period 2010–2018. Comparing outcomes before and after expropriation with changes among individuals not experiencing expropriation, I find that having one’s land expropriated decreases individuals’ trust towards local government officials, and increases the incidence of having conflicts with local government officials. I also provide evidence that the adverse political impacts can be mitigated by better local governance, undertaking projects with public benefits, and ex-ante non-agricultural employment.

We develop results for the use of Lasso and post-Lasso methods to form first-stage predictions and estimate optimal instruments in linear instrumental variables (IV) models with many instruments, p. Our results apply even when p is much larger than the sample size, n. We show that the IV estimator based on using Lasso or post-Lasso in the first stage is root-n consistent and asymptotically normal when the first stage is approximately sparse, that is, when the conditional expectation of the endogenous variables given the instruments can be well-approximated by a relatively small set of variables whose identities may be unknown. We also show that the estimator is semiparametrically efficient when the structural error is homoscedastic. Notably, our results allow for imperfect model selection, and do not rely upon the unrealistic "beta-min" conditions that are widely used to establish validity of inference following model selection (see also Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen (2011b)). In simulation experiments, the Lasso-based IV estimator with a data-driven penalty performs well compared to recently advocated many-instrument robust procedures. In an empirical example dealing with the effect of judicial eminent domain decisions on economic outcomes, the Lassobased IV estimator outperforms an intuitive benchmark. Optimal instruments are conditional expectations. In developing the IV results, we establish a series of new results for Lasso and post-Lasso estimators of nonparametric conditional expectation functions which are of independent theoretical and practical interest. We construct a modification of Lasso designed to deal with non-Gaussian, heteroscedastic disturbances that uses a data-weighted 1-penalty function.

Tenure insecurity can have important consequences for the conservation of natural resources. This paper focuses on two main sources of tenure insecurity, informal short-term tenancy contracts, and customary gender-biased inheritance practices. Using a large plot-level dataset from Malawi, the analysis employs a linear probability model with household fixed effects and finds that both sources of insecurity have a negative effect on soil conservation investments. These findings suggest that future land reforms should deal with the informality of the land rental market and address the gap between users and owners of land created by existing customary practices.

We study the labour market outcomes of Chinese household members changing their registration status (hukou) from rural to urban as a result of land expropriation using panel data from the 20082010 Rural Urban Migration in China (RUMiC). While it is largely unclear the extent to which expropriation can be viewed as an event exogenous to individual and household choices, we deal with the potential selection bias of being expropriated by using the methodology proposed by Oster (2019). Gaining an urban hukou is found to improve the labour market outcomes of expropriated household heads and spouses relative to comparable rural stayers and ruralurban migrants. In particular, hukou-changers gain better access to permanent jobs in the public sector through formal search channels. We also find that expropriated parents invest substantially more in children's human capital as compared to rural parents, suggesting that leveling the hukou status among children can contribute to reducing intergenerational inequality.

A driving force of urban development is “accumulation by dispossession” which occurs through expropriation, privatization, and commodification of land. While the macro theory is now well refined, there is still much we do not know about how the underlying processes occur and how they shape economic development and urbanization. In this study, we analyze 2009 survey data of land expropriation cases across 12 Chinese cities, and find that expropriation takes different forms leading to specific outcomes. In half the cases, local governments followed central government policies requiring them to pay standard rates of compensation, but in the other half, local governments negotiated with farmers over the terms of expropriation. In the latter scenario, farmers were more likely to receive compensation higher than the standard rate, particularly if they were embedded in local power structures, which we argue could be counteracted if all households in a rural collective negotiate one agreement rather than individual agreements. These findings move us closer to understanding why accumulation through dispossession sometimes contributes to economic growth and social development, and at other times undermines urban development leading to social instability.

This article finds that the existence of strong kinship networks tends to limit state interference with private property use in rural China by protecting villagers against unwanted government land takings. It then distinguishes kinship networks from other kinds of social networks by showing that their deterrence effect against coercive takings is far more significant and resilient under conditions of prevalent rural-urban migration than deterrence by neighborhood cooperatives and religious groups. Finally, the article attempts to identify and differentiate between various possible mechanisms behind these effects: it argues that kinship networks protect private property usage mainly through encouraging social reciprocity between kinsmen, which facilitates collective action against coercive takings. Kinship networks are more effective than neighborhood cooperatives or religious groups at sustaining reciprocity over long distances and, therefore, are less affected by rural-urban migration. Altruism between kinsmen, however, does not emerge from the data as a major factor.

中国全要素生产率还有显著的提升空间，而目前的地方政府财税体制可能是阻碍全要素生产率提升的重要制度约束。文章利用2004—2013年230个地级及以上城市的面板数据，采用工具变量法研究地方政府土地出让收入的上涨对城市全要素生产率的真实影响。研究表明：(1)以土地出让收入为中心的地方政府土地财政扩张显著抑制了城市全要素生产率的提升；土地出让过程中，地方政府抬高商服住宅用地价格以「横向补贴」工业用地低价出让的模式，导致土地价格和土地要素资源配置的扭曲，进一步抑制了全要素生产率的提升。(2)土地出让收入的扩张对全要素生产率各组成部分的影响存在差异性，既带来一定程度的规模效应，也明显地抑制了城市的技术进步(TP)和技术效率水平(TE)。(3)微观机制检验表明，过度依赖以土地出让为中心的发展模式导致行业和城市层面的「资源错配」效应，进而抑制城市全要素生产率。

20世纪90年代以来,地方政府利用土地制度的独特安排主导经济发展,一方面低价出让工业土地招商引资推进工业化,另一方面通过高价出让商住用地及土地抵押获取资金建设城市基础设施促进城市化,土地推动的快速结构变迁创造了中国的增长奇迹。但是,随着中国经济发展阶段转换以及"以地谋发展"模式潜在的诸多问题不断累积,以土地推动发展的效力减退、不可持续性显现。本文通过门槛回归研究表明,土地对经济的贡献存在"倒U"型的门槛特征,经济转型期土地对经济增长的发动机功能已经枯竭,不同地区存在的问题程度不一。在东部地区,过度的土地依赖导致了风险增加和低质量招商引资等问题,已对地方经济发展产生负面影响。而中西部地区复制东部地区的"以地谋发展"模式一直绩效不佳。

本文在共同富裕视域下，运用公共选择理论，使用全国2010—2022年1646个县域面板数据，构建多期双重差分模型，分析建设用地指标交易政策实施对县域城乡收入差距的影响。研究发现，该政策显著缩小了指标流出县域的城乡收入差距。机制分析表明，政策激励了指标流出县域增加对农村的投资，主要表现为农村固定资产投资和财政支农支出的显著增长，这些投资提升了农村产业发展水平，提高了农村居民收入，进而缩小了城乡收入差距。进一步分析表明，当省内建设用地指标稀缺时，缩小差距的作用表现为帕累托改进；当省内指标过剩时，差距缩小主要通过收入转移实现。此外，效果在采取协议出让方式以及地形包含丘陵的县域更为明显。

尽管资源错配与生产率的关系是近年来的研究热点,但文献却少有关于土地资源错配对生产率影响的研究。中国各地大规模的开发区建设,导致大量稀缺的土地资源被低效利用,在降低企业进入门槛的同时,也产生了严重的生产效率损失。本文利用城市层面和行业层面的数据,估计了以低地价、协议出让方式为主的粗放型土地出让方式所导致的土地资源错配对中国工业企业间生产率差异的影响。实证结果表明,一个城市以协议方式出让的建设用地比例越高,其工业企业间的资源配置效率越低,且此效果对土地依赖程度高的行业更为显著。本文采用了多个替代的被解释变量和解释变量,并利用地形和官员任期作为工具变量,均得到了稳健的结果。

在持续推进的土地要素市场改革的大背景下，本文以2007年我国工业用地最低价政策为切入点，利用政策实施年份前后及最低价标准在区县间的双重差异，构建广义双重差分模型来考察这项政策对地方经济增长的影响。本文发现，在受最低价政策约束的区县里，最低价标准每提高100元，区县范围内夜间灯光强度平均下降约2.6%。机制检验结果显示，“过高”的最低价阻碍了新企业的进入和已有企业的扩张，进而对地方经济增长产生负面影响。

研究目的：“标准地”出让改革是土地要素市场化配置中的政策创新，以全国各地级市层面“标准地”出让改革的实施作为准自然实验，探究该政策对工业用地利用效率的影响，为产业用地节约集约利用和制造业高质量发展提供决策依据。研究方法：超效率的SBM-Undesirable模型、渐进双重差分模型。研究结果：(1)研究期内，“标准地”出让改革显著提升了工业用地利用效率；(2)“标准地”出让改革对工业用地利用效率的提升效应呈现逐年积累的特征；(3)“标准地”出让改革对工业用地利用效率的提升作用具有明显的异质性：其中，“标准地”出让改革的提升效应在中西部地区和产业结构高度依赖制造业的地区更加显著。研究结论：地方政府应全面深化土地要素市场化配置改革，因地制宜地推行“标准地”出让模式，促进工业用地提质增效，赋能制造业高质量发展。

我国地区间经济发展差距较大，其中一个重要的原因是不同地区的土地要素配置存在很大差别，发达地区工业用地占比远高于欠发达地区。为了解释这一现象，本文从地方政府的土地出让行为入手，构建了地方政府的最优化模型，发现异质性的地方政府其最优的工业用地出让策略不同。在资本流动的情况下，当禀赋差距扩大时，发达地区会增加工业用地，而欠发达地区则会减少工业用地。这种差异提高了资本边际回报率的差距，加剧了资本流动，扩大了地区间的产出差距。地方政府的具体调控手段不影响结论，价格调控、数量调控和比例调控三种方式是等价的。中央政府限制发达地区建设用地指标的政策能够在一定程度上改善地区间产出的不平衡，而土地指标的跨地区交易机制又能够在此基础上进一步降低由此所产生的发达地区的效率损失并提高所有地区的福利。

针对中国经济正在出现劳动成本快速上升的现象,使用来自中国286个地级市2001—2010年的面板数据,用土地供应作为房价的工具变量,并结合东部—中西部边界样本的对比,在有效控制内生性可能导致的模型估计偏误之后,研究房价对于工资的带动作用,结果发现:2003年以来,政府开始实行倾向于中西部的土地供应政策,相应压缩东部的土地供应,造成东部地区房价快速上升,并进而推升了东部地区的工资上涨,而这一效应在中西部和2003年之前的东部则不显著。这表明,忽视地理对于经济发展的关键作用,用行政手段来干预土地资源在区域间的配置,可能对经济发展效率和竞争力产生负面影响。

本文基于各城市政府规划报告与企业主营产品，运用大语言模型构建城市重点培育产业及产业链上、中、下游企业分布数据库，通过事件分析法考察了我国建设用地审批权下放如何影响产业强链补链。研究发现，审批权下放显著促进了城市重点产业强链补链，且效应逐年增强。机制在于，在土地供给方面，审批权下放提高了政府对重点产业的土地供给倾向，降低了土地制度性交易成本；在产业生态方面，审批权下放促进了链主型企业引育和产业集群形成，从而扩大产业规模及上中游企业数量。此外，该强链补链效应因土地市场环境的不同而存在差异。最后，审批权下放驱动的本地产业链构建缓解了区域内产业同构。

改革开放以来，中国人地分离现象日益凸显，形成“人动地不动”的要素配置困境。本文将建设用地划分为生产性用地与居住性用地，基于量化空间一般均衡模型核算地级市层级的土地要素配置扭曲系数，据此识别建设用地指标转让地与受让地以模拟土地要素配置过程，并借助反事实分析方法量化评估建设用地指标跨区域交易的要素配置效应。研究发现，在全国层面上，生产性用地与居住性用地均存在配置失衡且呈现显著的区域异质性；居住性用地的供需矛盾依然突出，而生产性用地的要素错配程度则表现出边际改善趋势。建设用地指标跨省交易机制在效率提升与区域均衡双重维度上均优于省内交易，且居住性用地跨区域交易的要素配置效应显著优于生产性用地。尽管建设用地指标空间再配置难以实现效率最大化与区域差距最小化的全局最优解，但仍然存在帕累托改进空间。

We use household‐level panel data from China and a quantitative framework to document the extent and consequences of factor misallocation in agriculture. We find that there are substantial within‐village frictions in both the land and capital markets linked to land institutions in rural China that disproportionately constrain the more productive farmers. These frictions reduce aggregate agricultural productivity by affecting two key margins: (1) the allocation of resources across farmers (misallocation) and (2) the allocation of workers across sectors, in particular the type of farmers who operate in agriculture (selection). Selection substantially amplifies the productivity effect of distortionary policies by affecting occupational choices that worsen average ability in agriculture.

Using detailed household-level data from Malawi on physical quantities of agricultural outputs and inputs, we measure farm total factor productivity (TFP), controlling for land quality, rain, and transitory shocks. We find that operated land size and capital are essentially unrelated to farm TFP, implying substantial factor misallocation. The agricultural output gain from a reallocation of factors to their efficient use among existing farmers is a factor between 1.7- and 2.8-fold. We provide suggestive evidence connecting misallocation with the extent of land markets and illustrate how an efficient allocation via rental markets can substantially reduce agricultural income inequality and poverty.

Over the last forty years, China has experienced extraordinary growth under output market reforms, but the growth rates are now tapering off. Reforms in factor markets and city governance have been much slower and are viewed as having the potential to yield considerable efficiency gains. In this paper, we explore this possibility, tackling the key issues of local political manipulation of land markets and objectives of local leaders, constraints on the local budgetary process to finance infrastructure and capital market favoritism of certain cities. We use a structural general equilibrium model with trade and migration frictions, based on prefecture level data. We model the political process of land misallocation within cities which drives up housing prices and estimate city-by-city local leaders’ preferences over economic performance versus residents’ welfare. Counterfactual analysis shows that equalizing capital prices across cities, changing the political scorecard for city leaders to reward just maximization of local consumer welfare, and relaxing local budget constraints together increase welfare of consumers and returns to capital by 13.7% and 2.25% respectively. Housing prices would decline in almost all cities; and the reforms would reduce the current excessive, often showcase investment in local public infrastructure by 49% nationally. These reforms would significantly reduce the population of favored cities with low capital costs like Tianjin and Beijing and raise the population of cities with high costs of capital and low local-leader weights on consumer welfare like Shenzhen and Dongguan.

Resource misallocation can lower aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). We use micro data on manufacturing establishments to quantify the potential extent of misallocation in China and India compared to the U.S. Compared to the U.S., we measure sizable gaps in marginal products of labor and capital across plants within narrowly-defined industries in China and India. When capital and labor are hypothetically reallocated to equalize marginal products to the extent observed in the U.S., we calculate manufacturing TFP gains of 30-50% in China and 40-60% in India.

Land is an important tool for local governments to attract investments and promote local economic growth in China. Based on panel data of Chinese prefecture-level cities from 2003 to 2012, this paper employs spatial panel data models to examine the strategic interaction among local governments in industrial land supply and to indentify its possible sources. The empirical results show that there exists strategic interaction among local governments in industrial land leasing price. Local governments’ industrial land leasing price is significantly impacted by the action of neighbouring cities. They mimic each other – in terms of industrial land leasing price to attract outside investments. Empirical evidence reveals that the strategic interaction comes from both yardstick competition and resource flow effects. Local governments react more to their neighbours’ industrial land leasing price during political cycle periods.

This paper explores the causal effect of market-oriented reform on land use efficiency, by taking a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) design based on China’s land market reform. The reform in this paper refers to the event that the central government strictly directed city governments to choose market-oriented methods in transferring industrial land since July 1, 2007. Such an institutional background leads to a discontinuity where the probability of land transferred through market-oriented methods significantly jumped up after July 1. The RD results show that market does have a positive impact on land use efficiency, which is indicated by the shortened land development period, relaxing of the constraint on floor area ratio, and superior companies being screened out to become land buyers. These effects are not only statistically significant and economically sizable, but also keep robust facing multiple changes of bandwidth, alternate of the database, and deletion of special samples. However, we also find the positive effect of market is conditional on government-enterprise relationships. If we compare land whose buyers are companies with a close relationship with governments, market will neither increase the intensity of land use nor make superior companies stand out. This paper contributes to the literature on the efficiency of market for two aspects: (1) by using a novel RD design we identify the causal effect of marketoriented reform on land use efficiency; (2) by uncovering the conditional effect of market we prove the limitation of market in a transitional economy, where other factors like networks, political forces still play an important role.

This paper highlights the crucial role of land allocation mechanisms in promoting industrial agglomeration by examining China’s 2007 industrial land market reform. By introducing transparency into the land-selling process, the reform facilitated more buyers to compete for land (reflected by increased land sale prices), enabling local governments to allocate land to the most suitable users. Combining comprehensive data sets that include information on initial local industrial structure, new industrial establishments, and industrial land transactions, the empirical analysis finds that the reform significantly increased the entry of firms from industries aligned with local specialization, particularly in areas that implemented the reform more strictly. A back-of-the-envelope calculation indicates a 1.3% increase in the national average total factor productivity of new entrants over three years post-reform due to a better match between new entrants and local industry specialization. Supporting evidence demonstrates the reform’s positive effect on economic growth reflected in nighttime lights growth.

This paper aims to demonstrate the relationship between economic growth and the urban core area in order to help urban planners reach a better understanding of the pressures that are leading to changes in land use. Using a unique panel dataset with measures of China’s land use, it is shown that, during the late 1980s and 1990s, China’s urban land area rose significantly. Descriptive statistics and multivariate analysis are then used to identify the determinants of urban land use change. In addition to using more standard regression approaches such as ordinary least squares, the analysis is augmented with spatial statistical analysis. The analysis demonstrates the overwhelming importance of economic growth in the determination of urban land use. Overall, it is found that urban land expands by 3 per cent when the economy, measured by gross domestic product, grows by 10 per cent. It is also shown that the expansion of the urban core is associated with changes in China’s economic structure. If urban planners have access to forecasts of economic growth, using these results they should be able to have a better basis for planning the expansion of the built-up area in the urban core.

本文基于1999年至2011年中国281个地级市土地出让面板数据进行实证分析，发现土地出让具有随省级党代会的召开时间而变化的政治周期性。具体表现为：党代会召开前一年，土地出让面积下降约8.7%；党代会召开后一年，土地出让面积增加约10.1%。土地出让收入也呈现相同的政治周期性特征。这个结果在控制了官员个人特征等变量后仍然十分稳健。分析还显示，官员一上任有冲动大量出让土地，但是没有证据表明离任前会减少土地出让。原因是党代会的政治周期与官员更替并不等同，党代会是可以预期的政治事件，利益相关方会做出反应，从而对土地出让产生一定程度的扭曲。

中国地方政府有关工业用地出让方面是否应遵循“以地引资”的逻辑目前在学界仍存在不小争论，答案莫衷一是。基于地块和企业微观数据，本文系统考察了地方政府的工业用地出让价格对企业投资的实际影响。结果发现，工业用地价格提升能显著促进企业投资，这主要是因为抵押信贷机制下的融资能力强化；相比非土地类投资，价格的投资效应主要体现在土地类投资扩张方面，与此同时，价格信号下的市场化交易配置并不会进一步诱发城市内的土地错配问题。

本文首先构建理论模型解释了地方政府的土地引资导致企业策略性创新的激励扭曲现象。由于政企双方之间的专利信息不对称，企业为获得工业用地使用权和“隐性补贴”，会主动迎合地方政府对高技术企业的偏好，在事前采取“重量轻质”的策略性创新。企业获得土地后，为应对地方政府对经营成果的后续验收，仍然会延续此前的创新行为。其次，使用制造业企业信息和工业用地出让记录的微观匹配数据，实证检验了地方政府的土地引资模式对企业专利数量和专利质量的影响。研究发现，获地企业相比未获地企业的专利数量明显提升，但专利质量则显著下降，该现象在获得协议出让土地和特殊经济区土地的企业中尤为突出。

本文旨在提供一个分析框架，刻画改革开放时期中国独具特色的政商关系。政府与非国有企业之间的关系主要体现在地区层面，在「官场+市场」双重竞争机制驱动下，结成「政绩—业绩」纽带，并以此为中心形成制度化和人格化双重特征「混搭」的关系。这区别于英美等西方国家政企之间边界分明、规则清晰的制度化关系，以及发展中国家常见的基于血缘、地缘等传统社会网络的人情关系，也区别于狭隘互利的政治庇护关系。在一个地区内部，随着官场晋升流动性和企业跨地区流动性的变化，政绩—业绩纽带的强度在不同层级的政府官员与不同规模的企业之间也相应发生变化，由此形成了多面向、多层次、多维度的地区增长联盟和政商综合体。中国特色的政商关系在总体上弥补了长期以来国家层面对于民营企业制度化保障之不足，为中国的高速经济增长提供了重要的准制度基础。

土地制度是影响城市扩张的重要因素。本文将国家土地督察制度设立视为准自然实验，构建2000-2021年287个地级及以上城市数据集，实证分析土地督察是否抑制以及如何抑制城市扩张。研究发现：土地督察能有效抑制城市扩张，被督察城市的扩张速度约下降5.3%。土地督察对城市扩张的抑制作用主要通过威慑城市政府促进土地出让市场化、遏制土地违法利用、矫正土地策略性配置的“被动反应”，以及激励城市政府调低经济增长目标、提高土地利用效率的“主动选择”机制来实现。异质性分析发现，“被动反应”与“主动选择”均有空间异质性：远离海岸线、经济增长土地依赖度高、市委书记任期短的城市“被动反应”效应较强，而邻近海岸线、经济增长土地依赖度低、市委书记任期长的城市则“主动选择”效应较强。本文为深入理解国家土地督察制度的经济效应提供了新的经验证据，对推进城市治理现代化有一定启发。

在中国特殊的分权体制下，中央的宏观经济政策必须依赖于那些掌握大量经济和行政资源的地方政府配合。本文基于2007—2011年中国城市工业用地出让数据，利用双重差分方法考察了“四万亿”刺激计划对工业用地出让的影响。研究发现：(1)保增长压力会促使城市政府更积极地利用刺激计划而更多地出让工业用地，但财政压力却会制约城市政府对刺激计划的利用能力；(2)当且仅当中央实施宽松的宏观政策，那些保增长压力更大的城市政府才能够比其他城市政府出让更多的工业用地；(3)若市委书记的在任时间越长，尤其是超过3年，则会促使这些保增长压力大的城市政府在刺激计划下出让更多的工业用地。

与"土地收入最大化"视角不同,本文研究地方政府干预土地市场化配置的行为及绩效。首先,通过制度分析指出土地"招拍挂"改革后,挂牌方式成为政府干预工具。其次,检验了地方政府"为增长而干预"的行为。基于2003~2008年的地级市数据,用挂牌相对拍卖的使用比例衡量地方政府对土地出让的干预,发现城市禀赋越差,地方政府越多干预土地出让。最后,基于全国历年商住地块微观交易数据,证实挂牌相对于拍卖出让导致了显著的价格低估。将拿地企业名称与2008年经济普查数据匹配后,发现地产经营能力更强的企业通过挂牌方式获得了更高的地价补贴。然而,证据显示政府配置土地资源为当地带来的增长效应和土地利用效率均十分有限。

本文结合土地交易数据和地级市官员数据,使用地理边界断点回归的方法,论证作为招商引资的工具,地方政府官员如何出于晋升激励调控工业用地价格。回归发现,工业用地价格与市委书记任职时间之间呈现显著的U型关系,最低点出现在5年左右。官员上任后,晋升激励逐渐增强,不断压低工业用地价格,当任职时间超过临界值后,晋升激励减弱,不再压低工业用地价格。进一步地,工业用地出让的规模、住宅用地的价格和规模与官员任职时间不存在显著相关性。这些结果说明了地方官员出于个人政治前途的考虑,针对工业用地进行价格调控。拓展分析通过比较相邻城市土地价格和官员任期时间差,发现城市间压低工业用地价格竞争的证据,并发现了省际边界效应的证据。微观数据和断点回归的方法克服了以往文献的内生性问题,揭示了工业用地价格偏低的原因和背后的变化规律。

土地出让过程中地方政府官员利用“压低工业地价、抬高住宅地价”的方式发展地方经济，导致不同用途的土地出让价格之间形成巨大的“剪刀差”。基于官员变更频率的视角，在构建理论模型的基础上，使用2009—2018年中国211个城市面板数据，运用双向固定效应模型检验政策不确定性对土地出让价格“剪刀差”的影响与机制。研究发现：(1)官员变更频率增高引致的政策不确定性将显著减小住宅—工业用地出让价格“剪刀差”；(2)影响呈现区域位置和城市规模的异质性；(3)“剪刀差”随中国共产党全国代表大会的召开呈现政治周期性；(4)引入政企合谋变量后发现，官员变更频率越高，越能通过削弱政企合谋效应的机制减小“剪刀差”。

在现有分税体制下,土地出让是地方政府缓解财政缺口压力的重要渠道。本文利用2003~2010年中国149个地级市城市面板数据、并结合2003~2008年的中国工业企业数据库考察了国有企业在地方政府面临财政缺口增加时出让土地的作用。本文基本结论是:当面临较高的财政缺口压力时,地方政府会以较低的价格向国有企业增加出让土地,尤其是在经济增长下滑阶段、地方政府利用财政政策刺激经济的时候,财政缺口增加导致国有企业比重高的城市协议土地出让比例更高。从互利角度来讲,国有企业能够获得更多价格低廉的土地作为投入,从而提高企业的营业收入;同时,地方政府会因地方国有企业投资增加而获得更多的税收收入。

In China, urban land is allocated by leasehold sales by local officials. Attempting to end widespread corruption, the government now requires sales to be conducted publicly, by either English or “two‐stage” auctions. However, corruption persists through the choice of auction format and preauction side deals between favored bidders and local officials. Two‐stage auctions have a first stage where favored developers signal that auctions are “taken,” deterring entry of other bidders. Empirics show that both sales prices and competition are significantly less for two‐stage than English auctions. Selection on unobserved property characteristics is positive: officials divert hotter properties to two‐stage auctions.

By analyzing a panel on the political turnovers of 4390 county leaders in China during 1999–2008, we find that the revenue windfalls accrued to these officials from land sales have undermined the effectiveness of the promotion system for government officials. Instead of rewarding efforts made to boost GDP growth, promotion is positively correlated with signaling efforts, and with corruption. The robust positive relationship between land revenue windfalls and political turnover, or specifically promotion, suggests that those who are politically connected to their superiors and those beyond the prime age for promotion are the primary beneficiaries. The case for corruption is substantiated by the evidence inferred from anti-corruption crackdowns, which reveals that the additional effect of land revenue on political turnover and size of bureaucracy (a proxy for corruption) decreases significantly in crackdowns but that land revenue has no effect on city construction expenditure (a proxy for signaling).

Abstract By matching data on land transactions in China’s primary land market with detailed curricula vitae of board directors in publicly listed firms, we identify a pattern of ‘revolving-door’ exchanges between local officials and firms. The officials discounted the price of land that they sold to the said firms, and were subsequently rewarded with board appointments upon retirement. Specifically, these ‘client officials’ are three times as likely to be recruited by the ‘patron firms’ as board directors and enjoy a salary that is 23% higher, and 81% more company shares by comparison with directors who did not help firms to secure cheap land deals. All of these, however, are conditional on patron firms being able to receive a price discount, which averaged 19.4% when they purchased them in normal times. However, when client officials were constrained from providing a price discount during a surprise audit, the likelihood of client officials recruited as board directors was halved, with the price discount and extra compensation received by the patrons and clients, respectively, vanishing altogether. By providing evidence of the reciprocal benefits received by both parties, we demonstrate that the revolving door is used as a ‘payment’ rather than a ‘connection’ device in the Chinese context.

We investigate conceptually and empirically the role of economic incentives in the primary land allocation in China in the recent years. A theoretical analysis demonstrates how recent fiscal and governance reforms give rise to land conversion decisions and long run urban spatial sizes that respond to economic incentives even though the allocation of land between urban and rural uses is determined administratively. An econometric investigation of China鈥檚 coastal provinces finds that changes in urban area are increasing in the value of urban land and budgetary government revenues and decreasing in the value of agricultural land, results consistent with the theoretical analysis.

The functional zoning of land comprehensive consolidation and the selection of consolidation paths are the key content of the current land and space planning, and it is also an important measure to achieve regional sustainable development. At present, the research system on land comprehensive consolidation is not yet mature. The previous research area is relatively small and not representative, and an effective method system has not been formed. Research on the selection of functional zoning and a consolidation path is also relatively scarce. There is an urgent need to construct the theory and method system of land comprehensive consolidation functional zoning and consolidation path selection. Taking Dongying City in China as an example, this paper constructs a zoning index system from four aspects including natural conditions, location advantages, social economy and land use. The entropy method is used to determine the weights, and GIS spatial data visualization is used to analyze the spatial distribution characteristics of the index system. Based on the analysis, the grey constellation clustering method is used to divide the study area into four types of land comprehensive consolidation functional areas, and the results of functional zoning are adjusted according to the ranking of comprehensive index values, the principle of maximum similarity, and the continuity of natural space. The research results show that: ① There are 10 functional zonings for urban development and ecological protection land consolidation, and the main consolidation path should be the ecological country park consolidation model, which can effectively serve the urban ecological construction. ② There are nine functional zonings for rural development and cultivated land conservation consolidation, and their consolidation path should be based on a comprehensive rural improvement model that enhances the quality of the village and the development, utilization and protection of cultivated land resources. ③ There are 18 functional zonings for cultivated land improvement and ecological protection land consolidation, and the main consolidation path should focus on the cultivated land ecological improvement mode that emphasizes the quality of cultivated land and the improvement of regional ecological functions. ④ There are four functional zonings for ecological conservation and fallow recuperative land consolidation, and their main consolidation path should be the land ecological restoration and improvement model of construction land reclamation, cultivated land ecological conservation, and conversion of farmland to forest and grassland. The research results can provide references for Dongying City to formulate land and space planning, and can be extended to the design of comprehensive land remediation projects in other regions. It is of great significance to promote regional sustainable and scientific development.

The fact that firms seek political connections through revolving-door recruitment is widely acknowledged around the world. Using an original database including the information of listed firms' board members and parcel-level land transaction records, this paper documents how revolving-door recruitment makes firms stand out in China's land market. We show that firms with revolving-door recruitment receive special deals in land transactions, which are simultaneously reflected in the quantity and price of land. Specifically, connected firms buy more parcels and larger areas of land in the primary land market. Due to the particularity of industrial land, price discounts are only identified for commercial and residential land, while not for industrial land. Measuring economic activity by night light intensity, we find no evidence that land transaction under the influence of political connections has a negative impact on economic activity on land. Our research advances the understanding that the state-business relationship is an essential factor in resource allocation in an emerging market with government intervention.

By combining data from 1,055 local government leaders who had been required to move with data on 1 million firm land transactions from 2006 to 2016 in China, we find that firms followed their headquarter prefecture politician’s move by purchasing 76% more land parcels, with 54.52% lower unit prices. Land usage efficiency, measured by light intensity, is also lower for these follower firms’ land parcels, later on. We suggest that cronyism explains our findings. The anti-corruption campaign since 2012 instead led to higher land purchase concentration. Identification is from within firm variation at various prefectures through politician turnover.

近20年的工业化进程表现出“规模大、速度快、后劲足，同时还伴随着资本深化和金融深化持续进行”这五大特征。现有文献由于对土地要素的忽略，尚未能够很好地解释当前中国工业化的特色。通过对典型事实的梳理和实证分析，本文发现：城乡土地二元制度与官员晋升机制、财税制度和金融制度产生了激励相容，从而催生出了一个以“土地引资、土地财政和土地金融”为核心的高效融资模式。具体而言：由于在土地征收和出让环节享有双垄断地位，地方政府一方面可以采取低价供应土地的措施进行招商引资（土地引资），另一方面又通过享有超高的土地增值收益来为城市建设融资（土地财政），同时土地抵押的杠杆效应不仅放松了地方政府的信贷约束，更是有效缓解了快速发展阶段全社会的信用饥渴（土地金融）。但近年来出现的房价和土地征收成本的飙升以及土地金融所蕴含的重大风险等现象表明，“以地融资”模式是不可持续的。

本文基于中国区县级数据，构建强度双重差分模型检验了土地市场降温对地方政府债务风险的影响。研究发现：土地市场降温导致地方政府债务风险上升，其内在逻辑在于，土地市场降温导致土地流拍增加、土地出让收入下降，进而通过财力渠道引致地方政府债务风险上升。为应对债务压力，地方政府偏好发行长期债券并增加借新还旧比重，这进一步加剧了地方政府债务风险的累积。异质性分析发现，城投债存量较高的地方政府更容易受到土地市场降温的负面冲击，而财政收入质量较高的地方政府则能够较好地抵御上述风险。

面对快速城市化导致的巨额资金需求，以土地作为担保和偿债来源举债成为近年来中国地方政府的选择，这种行为可称为一种新的“土地融资”方式。本文实证发现土地出让收入能促进城投债（一种典型的地方政府性债务）的发行，表明土地出让具有融资放大效应。这种融资方式在解决城市基础设施建设资金来源的同时，也放大了当地经济对于房地产市场波动的敏感度，并使地方政府面临一定的偿债风险。

本文基于2016～2021年微观土地交易数据和融资平台财务信息，选取房地产贷款集中度管理作为外生冲击，分析房地产信贷调控通过融资平台购地托底产生的风险溢出效应。研究发现，房地产信贷调控趋严显著增加了融资平台购地金额和面积，这一影响主要来自融资平台低溢价购置郊区地块，发挥土地市场托底作用。由于土地溢价率较低和房地产开发能力不足，融资平台举债购地后较少开展土地抵押融资、房地产开发经营和土地转让出租，而是以地方政府部分返还土地出让金的方式缓解流动性压力。因此，房地产信贷调控收紧后，融资平台低溢价购地使其偿债压力加大和盈利能力弱化，从而引发房地产风险外溢至地方政府隐性债务风险。

本文聚焦中国2008～2019年期间市级政府的撤县设区行为，尝试通过呈现从目标到行动的完整逻辑链条，建立一个地方政府行为逻辑的识别策略，以验证市级政府撤县设区追求土地出让收入的行为逻辑。实证结果证实，市级政府为了扩大土地出让收入，通过撤县设区这种行政区划调整实现撤并县的管理权集中，在此基础上利用其城市发展规划权，对建设用地指标实施空间再配置，将更多建设用地指标配置到土地溢价更高的中心城区用于商住开发。同时，其通过推动空间一体化基础设施建设，强化了中心城区和外围城区（撤并县）房地产价格的联动。

近十年来,土地财政成为中国财政体制中最受关注的问题,一个主要的假说是地方政府面临了巨大的财政压力,出让土地获得收入是地方政府的"无奈之举"。本文利用1998—2007年部长更换的自然实验对该假说予以检验。研究发现:新任部长会显著降低其来源地城市的财政压力,这些部长会利用排他性的权力对中央的转移支付分配产生影响,使得其来源地的城市获得的转移支付增加12%;部长来源地的财政压力变化没有对这些地区的土地出让行为产生影响,无论是土地出让面积还是土地出让收入都没有随着财政压力的下降而减少;土地财政的真实原因是投资冲动,即使是中央指定用途的转移支付,都被用于生产性的基础设施建设,而不是基本公共服务的提供。因此,从本文引申的政策建议是,由于财政压力并不构成地方政府出让土地的真实原因,期冀通过向地方放权的方式来解决土地财政问题是不可行的,未来的改革方向应该是把重点放在土地财政制度上。

集体经营性建设用地入市制度打破了土地一级市场的垄断，提高了农村集体收入，但也引起对地方政府土地财政可持续性的担忧。本文借助SCP分析范式构建"市场结构—市场行为—市场绩效"理论框架解析影响机制，并用DID模型评估部分试点地区入市制度对地方政府土地财政的冲击效应。结果表明：(1)入市制度对地方政府土地财政确有一定负向冲击效应，但不显著，经安慰剂检验后结果稳健；(2)2005年广东省的入市先例并未造成其他试点地区形成入市政策的预期效应；(3)冲击受入市规模和入市比例的制约。

In 2009 and 2010, China undertook a fiscal stimulus program worth 4 trillion yuan, roughly equivalent to 11 percent of its annual GDP. This program was largely financed by off-balance-sheet companies—known as local financing vehicles—that both borrowed and spent on behalf of local governments. These companies have continued to grow since the stimulus program concluded at the end of 2010; their spending has accounted for roughly 10 percent of GDP each year, with an increasing share used for what are essentially commercial projects. Their spending has likely been responsible for an increase of 5 percentage points in the aggregate investment rate and for part of the decline of 7 to 8 percentage points in the current account surplus since 2008. We argue that local governments have used their new access to financial resources to facilitate favored businesses' access to capital, which potentially worsens the overall efficiency of capital allocation. The long-run effect of off-balance-sheet spending by local governments may be a permanent decline in the growth rate of aggregate productivity and GDP.

This paper considers the issue of local “land finance” in the context of China's fast urban expansion. In an analysis of China s land requisition and public leasing system we argue that low‐cost land acquisition is the fundamental cause of land‐related distortions that have occurred during China s urbanization. Granting farmers the power to negotiate directly with land users during urban expansion, combined with coordinated land tax reforms to consolidate local tax bases is the key to China achieving both equity and land use efficiency in urban expansion.

This paper investigates the impact of the abolition of the agricultural taxes in 2005 across China on county governments' incentives for tax enforcement. I show that the revenue loss of county governments was largely offset by tougher tax enforcement. The incentive for VAT enforcement can be weakened, however, if the county: (1) receives a lower share of total VAT revenues; (2) has a broader VAT tax base; or, (3) has more abundant sources of revenue from land sales. These findings suggest that incentives of local governments can be vital to tax enforcement and to the tax capacity of a country.

China's land finance system has been a key contributor to the country's “economic miracle” over recent decades. Based on both an academic literature review and data analysis, this paper provides an integrated understanding of how the parts of the system function in tandem around the pivotal role of profitability. First, it summarizes the essentials of China's land finance system with a framework for the self-reinforcing cycle between local governments' financing and spending activities based on urban land-use rights (LURs), and quantifies the magnitude of profits generated by the cycle and its contribution to China's urban development. Second, it investigates the institutional underpinnings that empower local governments as the monopoly supplier of urban LURs, and documents the rising temporal trend in land prices in most cities.

This paper examines how fiscal incentives affect the policy choices of local governments in the context of China. Based on exogenous changes in the intergovernmental revenue sharing scheme, we construct a simulated instrumental variable to resolve the endogeneity problem. We find evidence that local governments shifted their efforts from fostering industrial growth to "urbanizing" China, i.e., to developing the real estate and construction sectors, when their retention rate of enterprise tax revenue was reduced. The increase from the new revenue source compensated for half of the losses in revenue that resulted from the reassignment of fiscal rights. The reassignment had also the effect of retarding the industrial growth of domestically-owned firms in particular.

China's stimulus plan in 2009–2010 brought local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) and new types of land finance into the spotlight. This paper uses national parcel-level land transaction data to examine the causes and consequences of LGFVs' land purchasing behavior in China. We found that LGFVs overbid significantly in terms of land prices. We explore channels through which LGFVs bid high prices for land. The stimulus plan induced local government to increase debt and rely more on land-based mortgages and land leasing revenue. Fiscal pressure led to an increase in LGFVs bidding for land. We found that the stimulus plan changed local governments' control over land leasing and land finance. Local governments hold more of the land market and inflate land prices following implementation of the stimulus plan.

This article examines the recoupling mechanism of campaign-style enforcement and its effects on environmental regulatory compliance. Drawing on the policy implementation literature and institutional theory, the authors develop a conceptual model of campaign-style enforcement in which both resource mobilization and power redistribution are theorized to address decoupling problems in regulatory compliance. The two-pathway recoupling mechanism is evidenced by an empirical investigation of the implementation of China's energy conservation and emission reduction policy as part of that country's 11th Five-Year Plan. Findings suggest that campaign-style enforcement can effectively improve regulatory compliance when it addresses the efficiency/legitimacy conflict by providing policy incentives and reorganizing a clear hierarchy of political authority. The article concludes with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of campaign-style enforcement.

This paper examines how political considerations affect local officials' revenue maximization behaviors in the context of urban land conveyance in China. We analyze government intervention based on local officials' choice of two land auction types, namely “English auction” and “two-stage auction”; the latter presumably serves as a tool of government intervention. The major findings are threefold. First, for cities with higher housing prices, two-stage auctions are adopted more frequently than English auctions, and land parcels in these “hot” cities adopt two-stage auctions more frequently during sensitive political events, suggesting local officials respond positively to real estate regulation policy from the central government. Second, when city leaders are more incentivized to promote economic performance, they respond less positively to rises in housing prices. Third, such interventionist behavior results in a significantly depressed land price and housing price. Despite its intention of improving public welfare, this interventionism can susceptibly cause problems of misallocation and corruption.

运用中国家庭金融调查(CHFS)2011年、2013年和2015年数据,基于调查数据构建和计算城市房价收入比,分析房价收入比对家庭消费房产财富效应的影响,并进一步考察房价收入比对拥有两套及以上住房、有房出租、拥有大小产权房和不同收入阶层家庭消费房产财富效应的影响差异。研究发现:房价收入比高时家庭消费水平也相应较高,但房价收入比高却显著降低了家庭消费的房产财富弹性;拥有两套及以上住房、有房出租家庭消费的房产财富效应受房价收入比高的弱化影响更小,拥有大产权比小产权房更能抵御房价收入比高对消费房产财富效应的弱化影响,高收入家庭的抵御能力更强。

本文致力于构建一个快速城市化和工业化进程中的城市建设用地供给理论,并基于这一理论框架讨论中国"人口、土地和住房"的空间错配机制及其后果。制度背景分析表明:中国城市建设用地供给受制于从中央到地方的指标分配,依次包括了"总量指标的地区配给"和"区县指标的用途配置"两个阶段,住房市场因此受到多级政府指标配置行为的叠加影响。理论模型揭示了财政激励下区县政府对指标的用途配置逻辑以及城市化激励下省级政府对指标的地区配置逻辑。基于实证研究结果,房地产市场上上演的"中国故事"可概述为:逆人口集聚方向的城市建设用地指标地区配给模式,叠加偏向工业的用途配置模式,对居住用地供给和住房市场产生了显著的挤压效应,导致"人口、土地和住房"的空间错配。

本文通过在模型中引入房地产业与其他产业之间的投入产出关系，研究中间品需求渠道及其乘数效应如何导致住房价格对经济增长产生倒U型的影响。本文的研究发现：引入投入产出关系不仅能够提高模型对中国经济的解释能力，而且会通过中间品需求渠道及其乘数效应导致稳态中住房价格与产出水平之间出现倒U型关系——当房价较低时，两个部门之间的投入产出关系使得中间品需求和最终品需求相互带动，导致住房价格上涨会拉动经济增长；但是，当房价超过某一个阈值时，房价上涨带来的中间品价格上涨和生产成本上升导致厂商降低产出水平和对中间品的需求，中间品需求渠道及其乘数效应开始发挥反向的作用，导致房价上涨会抑制经济增长。根据中间品需求渠道及其乘数效应，在房地产调控中一方面要充分发挥房地产业作为国民经济重要支柱产业的作用，将促进房地产市场平稳健康发展作为调控总基调，避免调控政策大起大落；另一方面要充分认识到房价上涨过快对经济增长的不利影响，坚决贯彻“房子是用来住的，不是用来炒的”调控原则，遏制房价过快上涨。

本文在新经济地理理论模型的基础上,加入住房部门以及宏观货币政策变量,构建了城市间房价关系的理论模型。在实证上,通过基准回归和添加交互项,验证房价分化的影响因素及货币政策影响房价分化的机制。研究发现,住房供需空间错配导致大小城市间房价不断分化,持续宽松的货币政策加剧大小城市间房价分化。要想减弱城市间房价的过度分化,政府应建立"人地挂钩"制度并创造其发挥作用的配套条件,让土地及住房的供给与需求在空间上趋向匹配。保持货币政策对住房市场的中性作用,加强金融监管,严格限制资金过多地流向住房市场。采用差异化的土地、金融、财政、税收等政策组合,抵消货币政策等对城市间房价关系的影响。

住房供给弹性是决定房价水平的关键因素之一。中国城市的住房供给是否缺乏弹性?影响住房供给弹性大小的关键因素又是什么?为探究上述问题,本文构建了一个包含自然地理约束、耕地保护约束和容积率规制的单中心城市模型,重点考察了三者对住房供给弹性的影响机理,进而运用数字高程模型数据与微观土地交易数据,全面测度了中国城市土地开发中的自然地理约束和容积率规制强度,并基于2005—2013年中国城市层面的统计数据,采用外生冲击引起的需求变动这一识别策略来估计住房供给弹性。研究发现:中国城市的住房供给整体表现为缺乏弹性,而自然地理约束及容积率规制是导致住房供给缺乏弹性的重要原因;人口规模越大的城市,其住房供给弹性越小,且受自然地理约束的制约程度越高。这为中国当前房价整体涨幅明显,尤其是大城市房价居高不下的典型事实提供了一个新的解释视角。因此,政府应当坚持"因城施政"的思路,适当降低土地开发中的容积率规制强度,逐步增加供给弹性偏低的大城市土地供应,以促进房地产市场的平稳、健康发展。

本文利用2011—2014年全国流动人口动态监测调查数据,系统考察了城市租金上涨对流动人口家庭消费和社会融入的影响。研究发现租金上涨显著挤出了非住房消费,并导致流动人口的社会融入度下降。异质性分析显示,租金上涨对于年更大、男性、拥有高中及以上学历、在服务业工作的流动人口的影响更大。此外,租金上涨加剧了城市中流动人口与本地居民的居住分异。本研究对于如何促进流动人口更好地融入城市生活具有重要的理论和政策意义。

基于全国范围的调查数据和省级层面数据,本文实证分析了住房价格对居民风险偏好的影响,发现房价水平和房价上涨都显著提高居民的风险偏好。具体而言,在房价水平高、房价增幅大的地区,居民的主观风险偏好态度和客观风险偏好行为显著提高;当居民没有住房贷款、对房屋具有完全产权时,房价对居民的风险偏好影响更强;居民健康状况和拥有房屋数量对房价与居民风险偏好关系的调节效应相对较弱;区域性住房价格与居民股市参与度的关系,也进一步表明住房价格能显著提高居民的风险偏好。

完善住房市场体系是国民经济中的重要议题,限购政策作为政府稳定和调节房地产市场的主要手段,对房地产企业以及住房市场体系建设均有重要影响。本文利用上市房地产企业2008—2013年以及2015—2019年的相关数据,通过构建强度双重差分模型实证分析了两轮限购对上市房地产企业价值的影响及其作用路径。实证结果表明:第一,两轮限购政策均显著降低了上市房地产企业市场价值,当企业在限购城市销售占比越大时,价值下降幅度越大;第二,从企业经营绩效来看,两轮限购对其实际盈利和营运能力并未产生显著影响,第一轮提高了企业偿债的经营风险,而第二轮只是影响了企业的资产增长能力;第三,两轮限购对房地产市场产生异质性影响,第一轮并未显著影响房价上涨,而第二轮则显著遏制了房价上涨;第四,从股票市场看,第一轮限购主要是通过企业经营风险影响投资者预期,而第二轮限购则是通过影响房价来改变投资者预期,这进一步凸显了"房住不炒"的政策作用。本文的研究意义主要体现在制定与推进政策时应关注预期的作用,这对于当前"房住不炒"政策的长期实施及其政策效果的长期稳定都具有一定启示。

关于地方政府供地模式同时存在“饥饿供地”和“售地冲动”两种对立观点，造成一定的理论和现实困扰。从土地财政视角看，地方政府的最优供地模式取决于房价变动对土地供应变动的反应程度。通过构建2003—2016年地级以上城市土地出让的房价响应模型实证发现，房价对土地出让变动并不敏感。地方政府为增加售地收入，更倾向于扩大供地而非“饥饿供地”。区域异质性模型和城市等级异质性模型结果表明，无论东中西部还是一、二、三、四线城市，都更倾向于扩大售地。分位数回归和核密度估计显示，低房价及三、四线城市有更明显的扩大供地冲动。进一步的拓展分析表明，地方政府出于发展经济的目的，也倾向于扩大供地量。但现实中，由于土地指标受到严格宏观控制，结构性供地不足和普遍的售地冲动同时存在。因此，可通过挖掘供地潜力、增加用地灵活性来缓解结构性供求矛盾，以促进房地产市场平稳健康发展。

本文考察了始于大城市的住房限购政策对于住房市场泡沫的空间转移以及住宅用地出让空间布局的影响。研究发现,限购政策导致部分非限购城市房地产市场泡沫程度相对上升,并且商业住宅用地出让在政策实施后也向非限购城市倾斜。由于非限购城市经济活跃程度并没有因此增加且并非城市化过程中主要的人口流入地,这就意味着限购政策的空间溢出不仅放大了泡沫转移可能造成的房地产市场风险,也加剧了土地资源的空间错配。本文研究为决策部门更好地落实总书记关于房子"不是用来炒的定位"提供了研究依据及未来政策优化的方向。

2003年以来,中国的房价经历了快速上涨。本文从土地的空间配置政策视角出发,研究了2003年后土地供给倾向中西部的政策转变对城市房价上涨的影响。我们发现,2003年以后土地供给相对受限制的城市以沿海地区和内地的大城市为主,而这些城市恰恰是人口流入地。2004-2013年,与土地供给相对放松的城市相比,土地供给相对收紧城市的房价平均要高10. 6%,而且仅仅在土地供给相对收紧的城市出现了房价-工资比率的上升。本研究表明,当前不同城市之间房价的分化,根源在于土地供给在空间上与土地需求不匹配。未来房地产市场健康平稳发展的长效机制应该侧重增加住房需求较大地区的土地供给,减少土地供给在空间上的扭曲。

Hong Kong introduced a Tobin property tax—the Special Stamp Duty (SSD)—in 2010, which substantially increased the selling costs of short-term residential property holders. This study examines the effectiveness of this Tobin tax in curbing speculation and cooling down the housing market. We find that the SSD effectively curtails flippers who hold homes for less than two years and reduces their market presence from 23.2% in 2009% to 2.4% in 2011 and 0.9% in 2013. However, one year after implementing the tax, housing prices grow by 12.64% and 15.76% in the primary and secondary markets, respectively, indicating a lack of a market cooling effect. Flippers strategically defer sales to circumvent the SSD charges, resulting in the sharp bunching of urgent sales immediately after the lock-in period ends. Further, the SSD effectively increases selling costs and prolongs potential sellers’ holding periods, thereby significantly reducing liquidity and driving up prices in the secondary market. The unintended externality is that the unmet housing demand from the secondary market triggers a buying frenzy in the primary market, which increases the prices in the primary market as well. Our findings have policy implications for the viability of Tobin taxes for regulating real estate markets. This paper was accepted by Agostino Capponi, finance. Funding: S. Agarwal was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 72495154]. Supplemental Material: The internet appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.00370 .

China’s housing prices have been growing nearly twice as fast as national income over the past decade, despite a high vacancy rate and a high rate of return to capital. This paper interprets China’s housing boom as a rational bubble emerging naturally from its economic transition. The bubble arises because high capital returns driven by resource reallocation are not sustainable in the long run. Rational expectations of a strong future demand for alternative stores of value can thus induce currently productive agents to speculate in the housing market. Our model can quantitatively account for China’s paradoxical housing boom. (JEL O16, O18, P24, P25, R21, R31)

Previous articleNext article FreeDemystifying the Chinese Housing BoomHanming Fang, Quanlin Gu, Wei Xiong, and Li-An ZhouHanming FangUniversity of Pennsylvania and NBER Search for more articles by this author , Quanlin GuGuanghua, School of Management, Peking University Search for more articles by this author , Wei XiongPrinceton University and NBER Search for more articles by this author , and Li-An ZhouGuanghua, School of Management, Peking University Search for more articles by this author University of Pennsylvania and NBERGuanghua, School of Management, Peking UniversityPrinceton University and NBERGuanghua, School of Management, Peking UniversityPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreThere have been growing concerns across the global economic and policy communities regarding the decade-long housing market boom in China, which has the second largest economy in the world, and has been the major engine for global economic growth during the past decade. News in recent months seems to suggest that the housing boom might be slowing down. A main concern is that a housing market meltdown might severely damage the Chinese economy, which in turn might generate contagious effects across the world and slow down the fragile global economy that has just emerged from a series of crises that originated in the United States and Europe. In particular, critics are concerned tha

China is currently experiencing rapid rises in labor cost. Since 2003, the central government has increased the share of land use quotas allocated to the central and western regions to support their development. As a result, the relative decline in land supply in the eastern regions has raised housing prices and consequently increased wages, damaging the competitiveness of the Chinese economy. On the basis of citylevel panel data from 2001 to 2010, we used the per capita land supply as the instrument variable for housing prices and analyzed the sub-samples along the border between the inland and the eastern regions. We found that land supply policies have led to the rapid growth of housing prices and increased wages in the cities where land supply has been restricted, mainly in eastern region. This study indicates that regardless of the geographical advantages of the east region, land supply policies have had a negative impact on the efficiency and competitiveness of the Chinese economy.

In response to worsening housing affordability resulting from rapid housing price appreciation, some governments have introduced taxes or restrictions to reduce demand for local residential real estate by non-residents. We study the effectiveness of these efforts using the restrictions imposed by local Chinese governments in 2010–11 on the number of residential properties an individual could purchase. We use sales by developers of newly constructed units and exploit within city variation in the imposition of these restrictions to identify their effect on prices and transaction volumes. In addition to these direct effects on demand, we also identify the effects of these policies on supply using data from local government auctions of land to developers. Our results suggest that in the short run, restrictions on non-owner-occupant purchases significantly reduce activity levels by approximately 40%, compared to areas without restrictions. These effects diminish with time. However, there are no relative changes post-policy introduction in housing price between restricted and unrestricted areas. The results operate via enduser demand and not through the land market and the subsequent supply response by developers, as there is no relative change in either the number of land auctions or prices paid for land between districts with and districts without purchase restrictions following their introduction.

This paper aims at scrutinizing the influence of knowledge utilization on the actors' interplay and self-organized localized regeneration of an urban village in China, thereby developing alternatives to simple demolition and redevelopment approaches. In particular, it investigates a bottom-up place-making initiative for the upgrading of Xiasha village in Shenzhen. The case study shows how an urban village may take advantage of its favorable location factors by gradually and relatively carefully upgrading its built environment and developing its assets as profitably as possible at the same time. Despite its crucial role in understanding the regeneration of urban villages, the knowledge dimension is still absent from the respective debates in China. In the case of Xiasha, local, institutional and technical knowledge of stakeholders’ rationalities, behavior and interpretations were utilized simultaneously and strategically. Technical knowledge contributed to the idea of a spacious central square; institutional knowledge enabled its implementation; and local knowledge allowed to give symbolic meaning and local identity to the place by making strong use of traditions, historic memories and cultural values when designing the layout and the furniture of the square and its surroundings. Traditional local culture and festivals even experienced a renaissance. With an increasing awareness of the importance of urban villages as living space, more careful and gradual approaches towards upgrading urban villages are needed notwithstanding the low quality and serious urban problems that are very often found in them. The case study shows that the way knowledge is used may serve as a role model for urban village regeneration during high-speed urbanization in China, instead of resorting to simplistic developer-led, socially exclusive models of renewal.

This paper proposes a method for estimating the extent to which density regulation causes the actual housing supply per land unit to deviate from the unconstrained amount, i.e., the impact of density regulation on the intensive margin of housing supply. To overcome the challenges that both the housing supply per land unit (which is a combination of quantity and quality measures) and its unconstrained amount are unobserved to the researchers, we extend the framework of Epple, Gordon and Sieg (2010) by explicitly allowing substitution between the quantity and quality inputs in the housing production function and by imposing a regulatory upper limit on the use of the quantity input. We show theoretically that the land share of the housing value can be used as a proxy for the stringency of the density regulation. We apply this method in our investigation of the stringency of floor-to-area ratio (FAR) regulation in urban China at the land-parcel level and find that the regulation imposes a significant binding constraint on the housing supply per land unit. We then explore the spatial and temporal variations of FAR regulation stringency. We also find that the FAR regulation stringency intensified the housing price appreciation that occurred during the economic stimulus period after 2008.

Developing countries generally face the challenge of significant urban-rural divides during their process of industrialization and urbanization. Following the paradigm of the theory of urban bias (TUB), this article focuses on the urban-biased land development policy (UBLDP) in contemporary China, which refers that local governments expropriate rural land with the inadequate compensation and use a considerable share of net land revenue to develop urban areas instead of rural areas. On the basis of pointing out three practical facts about and proposing the technique to measure the UBLDP, its influence on the urban-rural income gap (URIG) is investigated by employing the GMM dynamic model along with panel data from Hubei Province over the period of 2010-2016. The results show that a 1% increase in the extent to which compensation deviates from the market value of expropriated rural land (ERL) leads to a 0.46% increase in the URIG, while this effect is attributed to an unbalanced urban-rural income growth associated with the land development. These findings not only generate a broad of direct implications for Chinese policymakers but also provide lessons for other developing countries.

Real estate is an important driver of the Chinese economy. However, data limitations make it challenging to evaluate competing claims about the state of Chinese housing markets. This paper brings new data and analysis to the study of supply and demand conditions in nearly three dozen major cities. We first document the most accurate measures of land values, construction costs, and overall house prices, then create and investigate a number of supply and demand metrics to see if price growth reasonably can be interpreted as reflecting local market fundamentals. Key results: (1) Real house price growth has been high, averaging 10% per annum since 2006, with substantial heterogeneity across markets, ranging from 2.8% (Jinan) to 19.8% (Beijing); house price growth is driven by rising land values, not construction costs. Real land values have risen by 14.4% per annum on average; in Beijing by 27.5% per year (1036%) since 2004. (2) Land values fell by nearly one-third at the beginning of the global financial crisis, but more than fully recovered amidst the 2009–2010 Chinese stimulus; more recent growth has been much more modest, with some markets beginning to decline. Quantities of land sales by local governments to private residential developers have dropped sharply since 2013, with transaction volumes down by half or more, which should lead to a reduced supply of new housing units. (3) Market-level analysis of short- and longer-run changes in supply–demand balances finds important variation across markets.

中国农地流转市场正在经历快速发展,农户在农地流转中的决策行为值得关注。本文的研究目的是在分析农地流转发展趋势的基础上,研究农户农地流转行为的影响因素。基于2013年和2015年两轮29省全国性代表农户的追踪调查数据,建立线性概率LPM模型和二分变量LOGIT模型,本文发现:第一,农地流转市场发展迅速,农地的集中化趋势明显,农地细碎化的现象有所减轻。参与农地流转的农户比例由2013年的24.1%上升至2015年的31.4%;农户户均土地经营面积从8.3亩上升至12.9亩;土地经营规模在10亩以下的农户比例从83.58%下降至76.87%。第二,农户参与农地流转的行为决策受到很多因素的影响。家庭的人口特征(家庭劳动力数量、家庭人口数量、家庭负担系数、男性占比、抚育孩子数量、有在读大学生子女等)、经济特征(就业情况、财富水平与收入结构等)、土地禀赋(土地的数量、质量、确权情况以及征收情况等)和社会环境因素(所在村的农地流转整体情况)均会对农户参与农地流转产生显著影响。

我国农村居民收入增长缓慢,现有的农地制度备受争议。本文认为,土地经营权流转能促进农民收入进一步增长,它的推广将使现有的土地制度得到完善,从这一视角研究农民收入问题可以填补已有文献的空白。本文借助2000年和2012年的农户家庭微观调研数据,采用平均处理效应(ATE)和受处理的平均处理效应(ATT)方法,实证分析了土地经营权流转对农户家庭收入的影响。我们的研究发现,土地流转能显著提高农户家庭的收入水平,实证结果表明,在平均意义下土地流转能使任意样本农户家庭和已流转土地的农户家庭的收入分别增加19%和33%。本研究的政策意义在于:鼓励和推进土地经营权流转可能是促进我国农民收入增长和完善现有农地制度的一个新途径。

农地经营权流转能使农民劳动生产率显著提升。本文通过建立一个基于农地经营权流转市场的农户决策模型,系统分析了转入和转出土地对农户家庭劳动生产率(劳均收入)的影响,得到如下结论:在土地流转完成后,转入土地的农户家庭总劳动生产率水平将因农业生产效率水平的提升而提高;转出土地的农户家庭总劳动生产率水平将因非农劳动生产率水平的提升而提高;未参与土地流转的农户家庭总劳动生产率绝对水平保持不变。为了验证理论模型的结论,本文基于2013年对21个省(市、自治区)30个县的农户家庭微观调研数据,分别使用倾向得分匹配法和代理变量法进行了基本的回归分析和稳健性检验。实证分析的结论与理论模型相吻合。

农地确权对农业生产效率的重要性似乎是一种共识，本文基于中国金融调查数据，运用倾向得分匹配双重差分基准模型和异质性模型，进行理论分析和实证检验后发现，农地确权对农业生产规模效率、纯技术效率和综合效率的影响均未达预期。如果没有相匹配的农业合作组织以及完善的社会化服务水平，农地确权本身并不会通过提高农地流转率或改善长期投资激励等方式来提高农业生产效率。与此同时，本文证实农地确权对农业生产规模的效率决定，受农业生产合作组织和社会化服务水平影响较大，而农业生产纯技术效率则不受影响。但综合看来，社会化服务水平的完善情况对农业生产综合效率的影响要优于农业生产组织对农业生产综合效率的影响。因此，现阶段单纯推动农地确权制度改革对农业生产效率的促进作用不大，而进一步提升农业现代化水平，把同质性小农户组织起来，发展适度规模经营，提供包括外包机制在内的社会化服务，才能真正实现农业生产规模效率和综合效率的有效提升。

本文基于2009—2019年农业农村部的农村固定观察点数据及浙大卡特企研中国涉农研究数据库，采用渐进倍差法研究发现，“三权分置”对农户收入增长有一定的积极影响，2019年施行修订的《中华人民共和国农村土地承包法》后，该政策效应有所加强。从关联主体作用机制看，“三权分置”主要通过工商资本下乡促进农户增收。从农户视角看，“三权分置”促使农户耕地转出租金提升、农业投资增加、农业生产率提高、本地非农就业增加，进而促进了农户收入增长。此外，“三权分置”对于欠发达地区或低收入群体的农户而言增收效果相对明显，在总体上缩小了农户收入差距。

城乡二元结构下，人口迁移决策将会通过流转带来土地再配置，并因此产生平均农业生产率改变。Sen(1982)曾经质疑过印度农村内部基于自由流转的土地再配置进程与农业生产效率之间究竟是正向还是负向的关系，本文基于中国特征事实为这一质疑提供了一个微观层面的证据。本文基于1986—2017年农业农村部固定跟踪观察点全样本数据，在改进Chari等(2018)农业全要素生产率算法的基础上发现：(1)农业生产领域确实普遍存在无效流转的状况，家户间土地流转对农业全要素生产率贡献具有限制作用，这一结论在不同测度下均稳健；城市化进程加速时期，无效流转状况往往更明显；(2)本文刻画了「U形」流转进行土地再配置的三个机制。本文为土地自由流转是否必然带来农业生产率提升这一问题提供了一个新的视角。

通过建立一个异质性农户模型,本文从理论上分析了确权对于农户资本投资的影响机制:稳定土地产权、促进土地流转、放松信贷约束。基于中国劳动力动态调查(CLDS)的农户微观数据,本文使用PSM-DID方法进行实证分析,发现土地确权后资本投资提升了20%。为了保证因果分析的可靠性,本文将农村固定观察点数据和CLDS数据匹配,进行了事前趋势检验;控制了地区固定效应和时间交互项;用工具变量法进行了估计。本文还进行了多种稳健性检验:改变估计样本、考虑其他宏观政策的影响、安慰剂检验,证明了实证结果的稳健性。异质性分析显示:土地确权对中等土地规模、东部省份以及中等生产率农户的投资有更显著的影响。本文发现目前确权主要通过提升土地承包经营权稳定性这一直接机制促进农户资本投资。

本文从土地流转视角讨论农业生产模式变迁问题。典型事实显示，样本期内农户土地流转率从4%上升到24%，农业经营主体转变加速；农业要素投入模式出现了结构性变迁，劳动投入持续下降，农机社会化服务与中间品投入等持续上升，土地经营规模化与分散化并存；农业生产效率提升明显，农户收入、亩均产出、劳均产出、农业全要素生产率等均快速上升。实证研究表明，土地流转对农业生产模式变迁具有重要影响，土地转出可以促进非农就业，提高非农收入和总收入水平，土地转入能够有效提升农业生产效率，具有较强经济显著性；从要素投入来看，土地转入能够显著降低要素投入强度，并在一定程度上体现了规模经济。总结而言，土地流转在提升整体农业生产效率的同时有效促进了农业生产模式现代化转型，但效应在不断减弱。

在务农成本持续上涨和省工性技术普及的背景下,山区地块细碎化逐渐成为抑制农民增收的重要因素。厘清山区耕地细碎程度及其对农业生产的影响,对于降低农业生产成本具有指导价值。基于重庆市武隆区、巫山县和酉阳县的1015份农户调研数据,分别从地块权属和空间分布两个角度测算耕地细碎程度,并采用半对数经济计量模型评估耕地细碎差异对农业生产成本的影响。结果表明:研究区耕地细碎程度严重,辛普森指数和地块距离指数分别为0.71和0.19,户均耕地面积6.19亩、地块数8.89块,地块与家庭平均相距430 m,即呈现出"块数多、规模小和距离短"的特征;耕地细碎程度加剧提高了农业生产成本,当辛普森指数和地块距离指数每增加一个标准差时,单位产量总成本依次上升33.8%和16.6%;具体到各单项成本,耕地细碎程度加剧显著提高了劳动力、化肥和种子成本,而限制机械及其他要素的使用。分作物的实证显示,耕地细碎化效应存在明显的作物异质性。此外,优质耕地能缓解地块细碎带来的成本上升,同时扩大地块面积有助于降低生产成本。政策启示:降低农业经营成本是缓解山区耕地撂荒的重要举措,政府应建立低成本的农地流转网络,并鼓励农户或村庄之间…

土地流转是中国农业生产实现从小农户到规模经营转型的关键。本文构建理论模型刻画了土地流转、农户就业选择与农业生产效率间的关系，强调土地流转不仅能直接提高农地配置效率，还通过影响农户就业选择和技术采用，间接提高农业全要素生产率，并估计了土地流转对农户转型和农业生产的影响程度。定量结果表明，若有效配置土地资源，农业生产将实现从小农户到规模经营的转型，农业全要素生产率还将提高71.02%。劳动力市场改革、农产品价格调整等均会影响农户转型和农业生产效率。

本文基于全国农村固定观察点(2004—2013年)数据,分析了中国农地资源分配的基本准则,估计了农地资源误配的程度,评价了土地流转对农地资源配置效率的影响。研究结果表明,村庄土地禀赋和家庭规模是决定农户土地经营规模的核心因素;农地资源存在资源误配且误配的程度逐年提高;只有转向农户的土地流转才能有效提高农地资源配置效率。若政策以提高农地资源配置效率为主要目标,则不仅要关注土地流转的程度,更应注重土地流转的方向。

现有农地制度安排造成的高交易成本已经成为阻碍中国土地流转,实现资源配置的重要障碍。自2011年开始全国试点的农地确权制度首次在实测基础上对农户承包地进行登记颁证,从而为农用地的大规模流转奠定了产权基础。为了探讨确权对农地流转的影响,我们建立了一个理论模型,并在此框架下使用中国健康与养老追踪调查2011~2012年的农户调查数据进行了实证检验。结果发现,在其他条件相同的情况下,农地确权使得农户参与土地流转的可能性显著上升约4.9%,平均土地流转量上升了约0.37亩(将近1倍),土地租金率则大幅上升约43.3%。因此,农地确权不仅降低了交易成本,促进了土地流转;同时也增强了农地的产权强度,从而提高了土地资源的内在价值。

本文根据农地流转双方地块位置是否相邻，将农户流转行为区分为离散流转和连片流转，考察新一轮农地确权对农地流转规模经营效应的影响。研究发现，农地确权通过减少农地边界破坏行为和农业生产矛盾，降低相邻地块流转的交易成本，显著促进了地块连片流转，进而推进农地的连片规模经营。不仅如此，相比离散流转，连片流转的书面合同签订概率更高、零租金更少、期限更长，有助于推进农地产权交易的契约化。文章强调，鉴于连片流转效应的时滞性，应坚持并深化新一轮农地确权改革。

本文首先基于农户行为视角构建解释农地流转诱因的微观理论框架,在此基础上,利用倾向得分匹配法(PSM)和中国家庭追踪调查(CFPS)中的农村家庭数据,分析农户土地流转决策行为并评价福利效应。研究发现,租入和租出土地均有利于提升农户收入并降低贫困发生率,但福利效应在不同家庭组之间具有显著差异。土地价值、农业补贴以及涉农贷款对农户租入土地决策具有显著正向影响,城市工资水平和就业机会是农户租出土地从事非农生产活动的主要诱因。此外,对福利效应的分解结果表明:土地租入户的净收入效应依次来源于耕地规模扩大、技术效率提高和中间投入增加,租出户的净收入效应主要来源于非农收入增加,部分来源于土地租金。

大国小农是中国的基本国情与农情，农机社会化服务是实现农业机械化与农业现代化的重要途径，但其对农业生产经营规模的影响有待深入研究。本文基于2000—2023年全国8省多轮农户追踪调研数据，系统探究了农机社会化服务对农户经营规模的影响及不同禀赋农户的异质性。研究发现，农机社会化服务显著提高了农户的务农趋势，但总体上并不显著影响农户经营规模。此外，农机社会化服务对农户土地经营行为的影响存在明显的异质性:导致小农户显著减少土地转出面积，对中等规模农户无显著影响，促使大农户扩大经营规模。因此，农机社会化服务对于农业生产经营规模化可能是一把“双刃剑”，应设计更加具有针对性的支持政策与配套措施。

This paper examines the link between property rights and investment incentives, developing three theoretical arguments based on security of tenure, using land as collateral, and obtaining gains from trade. The paper then presents empirical evidence from two regions in Ghana. The author investigates the possibility that rights are endogenous, with farmers making improvements to enhance their land rights, and suggests tests for which of the theories might explain the results. Journal of Political Economy 103(5): 903-937.

Abstract This article examines the impact of a property rights reform in rural China that allowed farmers to lease out their land. We find the reform led to increases in land rental activity in rural households. Our results indicate that the formalization of leasing rights resulted in a redistribution of land toward more-productive farmers. Consequently, output and aggregate productivity increased by 8$\%$ and 10$\%$, respectively. We also find that the reform increased the responsiveness of land allocation across crops to changes in crop prices.

While early attempts at land titling in Africa were often unsuccessful, factors such as new legislation, low-cost methods, and increasing demand for land have generated renewed interest. A four-period panel allows use of a pipeline and difference-indifferences approach to assess impacts of land registration in Ethiopia. We find that the program increased tenure security, land-related investment, and rental market participation and yielded benefits significantly above the cost of implementation. (JEL O13, Q15)

We develop a model of land leasing with agents characterized by unobserved heterogeneity in ability and presence of an off-farm labor market. In this case, decentralized land rental may contribute to equity and efficiency goals and may have several advantages over administrative reallocation. The extent to which this is true empirically is explored using data from three of China's poorest provinces. Land rental markets and administrative reallocation reallocate land to those with lower endowments but the former are more effective in doing so and have a bigger productivity-enhancing effect. Information on hypothetical market participation suggests that reducing transaction costs in land rental markets could help to realize significant additional productivity gains.

Previous studies quantifying the relationship between land titles and agricultural productivity have not explored the role of human capital reallocation. This paper enhances existing literature by examining the effects of land titling on the reallocation of labor with heterogenous human capital endowments between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. In reference to China's county-by-county rollout of the land titling program, this paper applies a difference-in-differences (DID) framework and finds that farmers with higher human capital are more likely to migrate out of villages following the completion of the titling program, which in turn causes a “brain drain” from the agricultural sector. There is a subsequent decrease in agricultural productivity and output. This productivity loss has not been thoroughly discussed in previous studies and nor considered in the policy making process. Our results indicate that future land reforms should consider the impact of land titling programs on the reallocation of human capital across sectors.

Abstract According to economic theory, tenure security is an important determinant of agricultural investment and productivity. Land titling has been at the center stage of development efforts of many African countries to boost tenure security. We investigate the productivity impacts of the Ethiopian land registration and certification program, employing propensity score matching method in an effort to create a credible counterfactual. Consistent with theory, we find land registration and certification has robust positive effects on farm productivity. More tentatively, we identify the assurance effect as one probable channel for impact. Households with land certificates are more likely to adopt soil‐fertility management strategies on their plots than households without certificates.

Abstract The relationship between farm size and productivity has long been a topic of debate in development economics. Using farm‐level panel data from 2003 to 2013, we investigate the relationship between maize yield and farm size in Northern China. After controlling for farm‐specific characteristics, we restore a mild U‐shaped relationship between maize yield and cropping area from the apparent inverse U‐shaped curve. This suggests that an inverse farm size–productivity relationship persists for most small‐sized farms. Further analyses demonstrate that farmer input choice between labor and capital is likely to smooth the non‐linear farm size–productivity relationship, with capital use being more likely to affect the farm size–productivity relationship at a larger scale. The findings imply that subsidizing farmers to rent land without helping them become better‐equipped could result in resource misallocation towards larger farms using less‐efficient labor‐intensive technologies.

This study examines how labor reallocation has been associated with land reallocation following the implementation of the New Rural Pension Scheme (NRPS) in 2009. Based on data from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Survey (CHARLS) gathered during two periods (2013 and 2015), it uses the discrete changes generated by the new program's rules to identify the impact on land reallocation, as represented by the amount of land rented out by the elderly and their spouses. The age 60 NRPS eligibility threshold is associated with large increases in land rented out. The most important channel identified is the increase in the number of adult-children migrants, which reduces the number of farm workers and may help relax credit constraints. In contrast, the NRPS program has had no impact on the extent of elderly labor; there are no changes in their time spent caring for grandchildren or paid work in the labor market. A deeper examination of the welfare effect shows that despite labor and land reallocation, the NRPS has had no impact on either household consumption or elderly well-being. This study contributes to the literature by connecting land (as a factor of production) with the pension scheme, which may have policy implications regarding how money transfer programs would affect land and labor reallocation and individual welfare in other countries in the global context.

China has accelerated its urbanization since the 1990s, its urbanization rate leaping from 29.04% in 1995 to 57.4% in 2016. While driving the large-scale migration of rural population to cities, the urbanization has expanded urban entities and urban space. This round of urbanization is a typical local government-led urbanization. As legal subjects of land expropriation and transfer, the local governments levied the land from farmers with low compensation and resettlement costs on the one hand and transferred land use rights to land use developers to obtain extra budgetary income on the other hand. Meanwhile, land has become a key bargaining chip for regional “race-to-bottom” investment attraction as the local governments have deliberately lowered industrial land prices to attract foreign investment, promote local economy, and develop tax bases. It is under this government-led “Land Expropriation—Land Selling” (LELS) Model that China boosted its urbanization and industrialization for more than a decade; therefore, China has become a middle-income country in its urbanization rate, industrial structure, and people’s income. However, two major dimensions of China’s urbanization, “population urbanization” and “space urbanization,” have shown severe contradictions and problems, and they are related to China’s traditional local government-led urbanization model, more or less.

This paper aims to examine the dynamics of land transactions, machine investments, and the demand for machine services using farm panel data from China. Recently, China's agriculture has experienced a large expansion of machine rentals and machine services provided by specialized agents, which has contributed to mechanization of agricultural production. On the other hand, the empirical results show that an increase in non-agricultural wage rates leads to expansion of self-cultivated land size. A rise in the proportion of non-agricultural income or the migration rate also increases the size of self-cultivated land. Interestingly, however, relatively educated farm households decrease the size of self-cultivated land, which suggests that relatively less educated farmers tend to specialize in farming. The demand for machine services has also increased if agricultural wage and migration rate increased over time.

土地在中国经济奇迹创造中扮演的重要角色越来越引起高度关注,但是,现有基于政府特殊性的研究忽视了土地的重要性,影响了对中国发展模式的理解和解释力。本文刻画了政府通过独特土地制度安排主导发展权的"以地谋发展"模式的特征和典型化事实,构建了土地作用于结构转变和经济增长的机制,通过建立一个纳入土地要素的经济增长计量模型,利用全国地级市样本数据检验了土地经由工业化和城市化的结构转变和通过资本形成对经济增长的影响,分析了结构转变不同阶段的土地制度安排及其变迁影响工业化和城市化的程度和方式。需要说明的是,本文研究旨在描述和解释中国改革时期形成的推动快速结构转变和高增长的"以地谋发展"的事实和逻辑,随着经济发...

基于全国典型村庄调研，分析不同地区农村宅基地闲置程度和成因。研究结果：(1)调研村庄宅基地闲置现象普遍，2018年闲置程度平均为10.7%。(2)各地差异明显：东部村庄闲置程度最高，中部最低；村庄离城市距离越远，闲置程度越高；平原村庄闲置程度最高；闲置程度随村庄贫困程度加深而升高。(3)闲置是乡村人口结构变化与宅基地利用失衡的结果，长期外出务工、城镇有住房、“一户多宅”、宅基地损毁引起闲置的成因占比依次下降。(4)经济增长和城镇化引起的就业非农化、人口市民化是直接动因，现行城乡二元制度和宅基地管理制度是根本原因。

本文从地方政府行为的视角，研究2015年实施农村集体经营性建设用地入市试点政策的背景下地方政府土地出让行为的变化及其原因。理论分析揭示了财政可持续性目标诉求下地方政府土地出让行为变化的驱动机制。实证方面运用PSM-DID方法，研究发现：农村集体经营性建设用地入市打破了地方政府单一供地主体地位，对其财政收入带来负面冲击。为保证土地财政收入的稳定性，试点地区政府将减少供地面积、抬升土地出让单价。并且，这一现象对于商服用地、住宅用地和高等级地块的出让以及财政压力较大地区体现得更加明显。文章建议在深化土地改革过程中考虑地方政府的应对措施以及地区差异，在保障农民财产权益与稳定地方政府财源之间做好平衡。

本文以2015和2016年启动的两批次集体经营性建设用地入市试点为准自然实验，构建多期DID模型，利用2012—2019年县（市）平衡面板数据研究入市试点对国有工业用地供给的影响及作用机制。结果：(1)入市试点显著促进国有工业用地供给，地方政府依然主导着工业用地配置；(2)这种促进作用会因中央部署批次及地方回应方式的不同而存在差异，在第二批试点地区、第二产业相对发达县（市）和经济欠发达的中西部地区更明显；(3)机制包括推动城市存量企业向农村流动进而实现存量国有工业用地再供应，以及增加地方政府的新增建设用地供给。

构建中国农村宅基地制度变迁的分析框架并提出改革方向。研究方法：制度变迁理论。研究结果：宅基地要素相对价格变化产生“外部利润”，引起利益主体的初级行动和次级行动，形成新的制度均衡。研究结论：中国宅基地制度经历了从自由流转到宽松流转到限制流转再到当前的“三权分置”等阶段，始终与同时代的乡村发展战略相互呼应、互为因果。须逐步弱化宅基地的社会保障功能，显化宅基地的资产功能。

本文在测算农村集体经营性建设用地规模及分布的基础上，采用土地用途管制的新视角，分析了农村集体经营性建设用地入市面临的困境。在工业、商业、保障性租赁住房等经营性用途中，农村集体经营性建设用地存在竞争力不足、入市进展缓慢等问题。进一步地，本文辨析了农村集体经营性建设用地入市与成片开发土地征收之间的关系，指出在入市受到用途管制约束的背景下，过度限制成片开发土地征收反而会抑制农村集体经营性建设用地价值的最大化。根据是否位于土地利用规划确定的城镇建设用地范围内，本文把农村集体经营性建设用地区分为“圈内”和“圈外”两种类型，提出了适用于“圈内”的直接和间接两种入市方案，以及适用于“圈外”的异地入市方案。

宅基地"三权分置"政策的提出并没有改变宅基地基本政策，没有改变宅基地是农民住房用地的性质。解决宅基地闲置和房屋空余问题、提高资源配置效率，不是单纯对宅基地使用权赋权扩能，而是落实集体土地所有权、保障农户资格权和房屋财产权、适度放活宅基地和农民房屋使用权等多方面的综合改革。文章主张界定宅基地的客体空间范围，地上地下空间发展权按规划赋予农民集体；在房屋所有权变动中，受让人不具集体成员资格时，生活居住目的范围由集体设定宅基地法定租赁权，商住经营范围则设定集体经营性建设用地使用权。

We exploit a large-scale land titling reform in China that clearly entitles rural households to land rights by issuing uniform land use certificates and study how this impacted entrepreneurship in rural areas. We find that the reform significantly increases business creation in rural areas without decreasing the quality of new entrants or incumbent businesses. It also spurs entrepreneurship among professional and large farmers and attracts more urban residents to start new businesses in rural areas. Additional analysis provides evidence that increased land and labor availability and productivity, and improved social trust may serve as the mechanisms underlying these effects. Altogether, these results reveal that well-defined land property rights have enabled more enterprise growth in rural areas.

After nearly four decades, China's rural land tenure arrangement remains by and large how it looked like at the beginning of the economic reform. Rural land remains collectively owned. Peasants contract land from collectives, with their tenure insecure, and their transfer rights restricted. If such an arrangement was deemed a historical legacy at the beginning of the reform, it now looks more and more like a constrained efficient design by historical accident. This article suggests the constraints against which this design may be constrained efficient, and provides a stylised model that matches a wide array of empirical patterns.

Abstract As urbanization continues to fuel land and property conflicts in rural China, shareholding has been promoted as a reform in property rights that would enhance bottom-up control in the governance of collective assets. The recent proliferation of community-based shareholding companies has been credited for giving villagers new identities as shareholders, which entitle them to vote, receive their share of collective profits, and elect the managers of their wealth. This paper critically appraises these reforms and offers a contrarian perspective to singular narratives of villager empowerment. While shareholding clarifies villagers’ rights of control, income and transfer in collective property, the effective exercise of such powers is often forestalled on the ground by the concentration of power in elite hands. To the extent that formal and informal constraints on cadre power remain tenuous, shareholding could function as a vehicle for the powerful to appropriate collective wealth rather than as a weapon of the weak.

As land conversion has led inevitably to socioeconomic dislocations in China, a variety of bottom—up reforms have been designed to mitigate and contain the resultant conflicts. This evolves the creation of a mechanism both to allow peasants to benefit from the increase of land value in the urbanisation process and also to redistribute interests to individual rural villagers. This paper focuses on on-going shareholding reforms which aim to clarify villagers' property rights under the current structure of collective ownership. Three cases best exemplify these issues: Wusha village in Guangdong, Qunyi village in Jiangsu and Daliushu village in Beijing. The comparison reveals divergent experiences of reform among landless farmers and how the adoption of property rights reforms has restructured the concept and organisation of rural collectives.

Rapid urbanisation in China has led to a substantial decrease in agricultural land. To address this unsustainable form of urban development, the Chinese government has implemented the ‘Linkage’ Policy ( Zengjian Guagou), which requires any increase in new urban land by local governments to be compensated for with an equivalent amount of new arable land. This paper examines the institutional changes and the implications for China’s land production and development arising from this mechanism of transferring land development rights from the rural to the urban sectors. Using Chengdu as a case study, our research concludes that this institutional mechanism has conferred commodified and tradeable development rights on rural land, leading to the emergence and direct involvement of new players in village land consolidation, resettlement of affected villagers and, indirectly, in the supply of new urban land. Process efficiency has been improved with the local governments, developers and village collectives capitalising on their niches in village improvement projects. The conventional state-led model of land production is enriched with bottom-up market initiatives, and villagers have more choices to realise their land property rights under the dual land market. Land use efficiency has been enhanced by the reallocation of construction land potential. However, infringements of villagers’ interests and negative impacts on balanced regional development under this policy were also found.

China's state planned land use system, including regulations such as setting planned quotas for land use, basic cropland preservation, and pursuing a balance between the conversion of arable land into non‐agricultural use and the supplement of new agricultural land, has substantially constrained the economic growth of industrial provinces in China. This article explores the innovative reforms adopted by Zhejiang Province through land development rights (LDR) transfer within a locality and LDR trading across localities. We argue that there is a “Zhejiang model of LDR transferring and trading,” which, we believe, has significant implications not only for fostering an efficiency‐enhancing market for land development rights and agricultural land preservation, but also for optimal use of land and a more balanced regional development. One important policy issue relating to China's rural land system is that under China's land requisition system, farmers are usually under compensated for urban land‐taking.

Since 2015, a national trial on rural construction land marketization has been conducted in 15 counties in China; this trial is regarded as the most significant step taken to date to reform the extant rural-urban dual land governance system. The trial aims to investigate the performance of an integrated rural-urban construction land market in facilitating land resource allocation efficiency and land revenue distribution equality. The theoretical model for rural construction land marketization is extended based on Tan, Qu, Heerink and Mettepenningen (2011), a partial equilibrium model is developed for the empirical analysis, and recent practices in Deqing County, Zhejiang Province, are examined for empirical evidence. The study concludes that 1) rural construction land marketization indeed improves land allocation efficiency, and 2) it also leads to a welfare gain for the rural sector, in particular by inducing redistribution effects from the urban to the rural sector.

The fate of Chinese urban villages ( chengzhongcun) has recently attracted both research and policy attention. Two important unaddressed questions are: what are the sources of informality in otherwise orderly Chinese cities; and, will village redevelopment policy eliminate informality in the Chinese city? Reflecting on the long-established study of informal settlements and recent research on informality, it is argued that the informality in China has been created by the dual urban–rural land market and land management system and by an underprovision of migrant housing. The redevelopment of chengzhongcun is an attempt to eliminate this informality and to create more governable spaces through formal land development; but since it fails to tackle the root demand for unregulated living and working space, village redevelopment only leads to the replication of informality in more remote rural villages, in other urban neighbourhoods and, to some extent, in the redeveloped neighbourhoods.

基于2022年CRRS村庄及家庭层面微观调查数据，运用两阶段最小二乘法实证分析村庄组织化程度对耕地非粮化的影响，并利用中介效应模型检验其作用机制。研究结果：(1)村庄组织化程度会显著抑制耕地非粮化，且村庄组织化程度每增加一个单位，粮食种植比例平均上升2.647。(2)村庄组织化程度通过土地适度规模经营和农业社会化服务规模经营两条路径抑制耕地非粮化。(3)村庄组织化程度的非粮化抑制效应在小农户、非平原地区更显著。

本文将新增费缴纳、新增费分配过程有机结合，视为横向跨区域财政转移支付，即新增费由建设用地指标多的非农发展区流向耕地保护任务重的农地保护区，并考察这种以新增费为载体的跨区域财政转移制度的耕地保护作用机理。采用中国2005—2015年间省级面板数据，通过建立动态面板计量模型和引入系统GMM估计方法进行实证检验。研究结果表明：以新增费为载体的省际横向跨区域财政转移制度有助于调动地方政府保护耕地的积极性，达到耕地保护的目的，但是其发挥的作用非常有限。相比于新增费分配，新增费缴纳的耕地保护效果更好。

文章探讨社会资本、耕地价值认知与农户耕地保护支付意愿之间的相互作用关系。利用武汉「1+8」城市圈483份农户调研数据，在测度农户社会资本和耕地价值认知的基础上，采用有调节的中介效应模型实证检验三者之间的影响机制。结果显示：①社会资本作为一种内在的激励机制，对农户耕地保护支付意愿具有显著的促进作用，社会资本每增加一个单位，其耕地保护支付意愿程度增加3.695个单位。②社会资本正向影响农户耕地价值认知，农户耕地价值认知正向促进农户耕地保护支付意愿，表明社会资本对耕地保护支付意愿的影响可通过影响耕地价值认知这一路径进行传导，耕地价值认知起到中介变量的作用。③收入水平在农户耕地价值认知对其耕地保护意愿的影响中起到显著正向调节作用，其影响系数为0.266。

本文以耕地保护政策为准自然实验系统评估了耕地约束对区域粮食生产的影响。研究发现，耕地保有量约束的强化虽有效稳定了耕地面积，却未对粮食产量产生明显的促进作用。机制分析表明，政策仅增强地方政府对“耕地”的重视，并未同步提高对“粮食”的关注。政策引致的耕地保有量增加效应，集中来自坡度较高、有机质含量较低的区域。在此情况下，政策未能有效提升粮食播种面积，粮食单产反而有所下降。基于政策协同视角的分析发现，耕地保护与农业补贴政策相结合，能显著扩大粮食播种面积并提升总产量。

研究目的：解构中华人民共和国成立以来中国耕地保护制度的嬗变过程，凝练政策演化的综合归因和隐性规律。研究方法：归纳演绎法和理论分析法。研究结果：(1)中国耕地保护制度经历了"意识觉醒—概念深化—制度发展—转型完善"的过程；(2)耕地保护制度的内涵变革呈现出从"数量"转变为"数量+质量"，再跃迁到"数量+质量+生态"三位一体的均衡管理，完成了由"国策—基本国策—生命线—红线"的地位进阶；(3)耕地保护的现实障碍主要源于行政体制、资源本底、质量风险和生态健康四大逻辑本体。研究结论：耕地保护面临体制效能发挥不充分和区域空间不均衡的新矛盾。

本文对2004年新一轮粮改以来中国粮食安全治理的发展趋势、挑战及其成因进行分析。研究认为：新一轮粮改以来，粮食安全治理的精准性、系统性和社会化水平不断提高，政府宏观调控与市场调节作用增强，财政投入与科技支撑加大，保障水平稳步提升。同时面临资源和环境约束趋紧、生产成本高企、供求结构失衡、产业发展质量不高等挑战；成因包括治理有效合力不足、中微观层次粮食安全观不明确、法治化和专业化水平待提高、对产业协调发展重视不够等。

采用文献计量法和演绎推理法分析中国耕地占补平衡的研究文献，梳理制度的历史发展脉络与主要研究方向。结果显示：中国耕地占补平衡研究经历了从定性到定量、简单到复杂的四个阶段——注重数量保护的起步阶段、数量质量相结合的发展阶段、快速城镇化新形势下的深入阶段、数量质量生态三位一体阶段。现今研究导向是促进生态文明建设，涉及六个主要研究方向，包括内涵拓展、质量绩效、责任主体、差别化补偿、行政管理机制与法律法规研究。

As China becomes more industrial and urbanized, it is likely to become more dependent over time on imports of (especially land-intensive) farm products, most notably livestock feedstuffs. If farmers are slow to adjust to their declining competitiveness, for example by obtaining off-farm employment, the farm–nonfarm household income gap may increase. A decline in food self-sufficiency may be perceived as undermining national food security, and a persistent farm–nonfarm income gap as contributing to social unrest. In these circumstances, what offsetting or compensating policy options should the government consider for ensuring adequate long-term food security and less income inequality? This paper evaluates China's historical record since 1980 and then projects China's economy to 2030, using the GTAP global economy-wide model. It draws on past policy experiences of both China and other economies to evaluate prospective interventions by government to address food security and income inequality.

In China during the reform period, the multitude of conflicts between the state or its agents and peasants has become a serious concern for the Chinese government. A fundamental reason for these conflicts is the fact that peasants' basic economic or political interests have been threatened or ignored. Using the case of non-agricultural use of farmland, this study seeks to explain why the peasants' lack of resistive power appears institutionalized in China. The use of rural land often gives rise to conflicts because peasants are usually under-compensated for their land. Facing the encroachment of their interests, peasants may take ex ante preventive action and ex post measures. While ex ante action is more effective, it is not always feasible because it needs the organizing of village cadres. Hence, peasants are weak because usually action can only be taken ex post , which, more often than not, is ineffective because of the political arrangements through which the state, peasants and cadres interact.

Abstract This article examines relationships between willingness to pay for land preservation and policy process attributes. The approach departs from traditional welfare assessments in that it does not constrain attributes of the policy process to be utility‐neutral. Results indicate policy process attributes may influence utility in some circumstances, even after controlling for the influence of land use outcomes often correlated with specific policy techniques. Results further imply that in some cases, even comprehensive specification of land use outcomes by stated preference instruments may be insufficient to prevent systematic shifts in willingness to pay related to unspecified, yet assumed, policy process attributes.

Purpose Based on the brief historical review, the purpose of this paper is to expound the target and bottom line for the farmland institutional reform of in China, analyze the “Chinese scenes” and historical heritage of farmland institutional arrangement, evaluate the policies and their effects over the last four decades and outline the keynotes and possible direction of the future reform. Design/methodology/approach The paper builds the analytical clue of “institutional target – institutional heritage – policy effort – realistic dilemma – future direction” and review and forecast the Chinese farmland institutional reform. Findings The farmland institution is an important issue with Chinese characteristics. Over the last four decades, the farmland institutional reform in China has focused on “stabilizing the land property rights” and “promote the farmland transfer.” As the study indicates, the promotion of farmland transfer has not effectively improved the scale economy of agriculture and stabilizing land property rights by titling may restrain the development of farmland transfer market because farmland transfer is of special market logic. Originality/value It depends on the revitalization of farmland management rights to resolve the transaction constraint of personal property and its endowment effect in farmland transfer. And, classifying the land management property to involve farmers into the economy of division can be reference for the reform of traditional agriculture worldwide.

The relationships between migration and agriculture represent a key aspect of rural restructuring in China and many other developing countries. Previous research largely generated mixed and incomplete findings on the effects of rural out-migration on agricultural change. Using a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) approach, we conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis of recent case studies of labor out-migration and agricultural change in rural China. The analysis revealed general contextual patterns of migration impacts on agriculture. Migration-induced agricultural change was mainly conditional upon the specific conjunctural configuration of a rural community's economic development level or geographical locality, its land resources and dependence on agriculture.

The current system of converting farmland to urban land use in China can be characterized as a hybrid system that combines government controls with market-based transfers. In this paper we argue that this hybrid governance structure causes an over-conversion of farmland from the rural to the urban sector, as compared to a competitive market situation, and a welfare reallocation that discriminates against farmland owners. We develop a partial equilibrium model that can be used to examine the impact of the current hybrid governance structure on the over-conversion of farmland and to analyze the welfare changes for different groups of actors and the resulting net social welfare loss. Using a dataset with detailed information on farmland acquisitions and urban land transactions in Yingtan City in Jiangxi Province, we illustrate how this framework can be applied. Our results indicate an over-conversion of 33.5% of the total converted farmland in this city between 1999 and 2003. The welfare of farmland owners affected by the conversion decreased by 1.38billion RMB, while the net social welfare loss equaled more than 270million RMB during the same period. The local government obtained 380million RMB of revenues by re-selling farmland as urban land through competitive conveyance mechanisms between 2002 and 2005, while the manufacturing sector gained an estimated 280million RMB from buying land use rights at relatively low prices. We conclude that the current policy of increasing urban land conveyance through competitive mechanisms does not address two major underlying causes of over-conversion, and that protection of farmland would be better served by replacing the current hybrid rural to urban land market structure by a competitive land market.

Rapid expansion of agrarian capitalism in China has commanded much attention. This paper situates the rise of agrarian capital in the context of fear regarding “Who will feed China?”, demonstrating how the pursuit of grain self-sufficiency in the country has fueled the expansion of agribusiness enterprises and large farms. The policies to increase grain production, including the grain crop subsidy program, the incentive scheme for grain-producing regions, and the policy of nurturing new agricultural units, provide favorable conditions for agrarian capital of both domestic and foreign origins to take root and expand. As a result, the emphasis on self-sufficiency has strengthened the alliance between the state and large capital, and placed small farming households at a disadvantage.

As the locus of political power, state is widely acknowledged to play an important role in achieving Sustainable Development Goals, particularly in food security. However, the means through which states can harness their power to enhance food security, particularly in developing countries, has yet to be thoroughly explored. This paper addresses this gap by examining the effects of enhanced accountability on food security, and investigating how it can operationalize food security goals into enforceable directives for lower-tier officials, with a focus on China. Utilizing the implementation of the “provincial governor responsibility system for farmland protection and grain production” as a natural experiment and employing a difference-in-difference strategy, we demonstrate that main grain-producing areas (MGPAs), whose governors’ promotion is more tightly linked to food producing, experience a more significant increase in grain sowing areas when compared to other provinces. The results are robust facing a series of robustness checks. Additionally, by considering the dispatch of central inspection team, political cycle, and governor’s tenure as the sources of variations in accountability, we confirm that the key mechanism at play is the accountability inherent in China’s nomenklatura system, rather than alternative economic incentives. The back-of-the-envelope calculation demonstrates the increased grain production caused by strengthened accountability could meet the basic food needs of at least 8.76 million people annually. Our findings highlight that crafting tailored policies based on different political systems to strengthen official accountability is of great significance for better governance of food security.

Purpose This study explores how the land tenure system helps in protecting land quantity during agricultural production by estimating the influence of land certification on cropland abandonment, its mechanisms and its heterogeneous effects among groups at the provincial, community and household levels. Design/methodology/approach To deal with potential homogeneity concerns, the authors investigate the impact of land certification on the area of abandoned croplands using nationally representative panel data from the 2017 and 2019 China Rural Household Panel Survey on 15,000 households across 29 provinces and time-varying difference-in-differences and propensity score matching-difference-in-differences models. Findings Land certification significantly contributes to the protection of land quantity during agricultural production, and it reduces the area of abandoned croplands by at least 4%. This effect is mainly achieved by improving soil fertility, promoting land transfer, increasing the availability of agricultural subsidies and raising agricultural income. However, while land certification benefits farmers in nonmajor grain-producing areas and western regions, in plain, remote and nonpolitically central villages, and farmers who have not undergone land transfer or land adjustment, it is not beneficial for others. Research limitations/implications In the postepidemic era, food security based on the protection of the amount of cultivated land becomes increasingly important. It is realistic and inevitable to rationally use every inch of cultivated land and curb the cropland abandonment by strengthening land tenure system reform, especially in the case of the insecurity of land tenure. Practical implications There are various factors affecting farmers' cropland abandonment, such as poor soil fertility, unavailable land transfer, too little agricultural subsidies and too low agricultural income, but the root cause is the insecurity of land tenure. Empirical evidence from rural China has shown that a clear definition and effective protection of property rights can help curb the cropland abandonment. Enhancing the land protection behavior of farmers through the reform of land certification and promoting the sustainable use of land are what the reform of land tenure system should be. Social implications Cultivated land, as the material carrier and endowment basis of grain production, is of great importance to safeguarding national food security, especially in the postepidemic era. At the present stage, it is still necessary for most developing countries to strengthen the construction of land tenure system, to carry out land certification reform and to issue farmers with clearly defined and legally effective land certificates. Equally important, efforts also should be made to promote the diversified utilization of the achievements of the certification after the completion of land certification reform in China and other developing countries. Originality/value Expropriation and occupation of croplands are essential in protecting land quantity during rapid urbanization, and so is reducing cropland abandonment during agricultural production; therefore, it deserves close attention. In this regard, this study estimates the impact of land certification on the area of abandoned croplands, examines its possible mechanisms and identifies its heterogeneous effects to test the applicability of the property rights theory in the Chinese context and enrich the relevant literature and provide Chinese evidence for other developing countries to strengthen the protection of land quantity, by deepening the reform of the land tenure system under different circumstances.